Will Walker Walk?

On Sunday, the Pittsburgh Tribune-Review Pirates beat writer Rob Biertempfel had an article about Pirates second baseman Neil Walker entitled, "Despite Hometown Ties, Walker Knows Time with Pirates Likely Nearing End." Biertempfel pointed out that:

• Walker is eligible for salary arbitration next year, and can be a free agent after next season.
• He's making $8 million this year, and could probably expect to earn $10 million next year.
• He's 30 years old and has had back problems in the past.
• Josh Harrison has played primarily second base since returning from the disabled list in August, and started the first two games of the recent Cardinals series there instead of Walker.
• Given that writing on the wall and Walker's looming free agency, "it's possible the Pirates will jump that deadline this offseason by non-tendering or trading him."

A couple comments: First, it's true that Harrison started instead of Walker on September 4 and 5 against St. Louis , but Walker had had only one day off since the All-Star break prior to the first game, and was batting just .206 with two extra-base hits (both doubles) in his last 13 games. In the second game, the starter was Cardinals lefty Jaime Garcia, and Walker is hitting just .239 with a .584 OPS against lefties this year, while Harrison's numbers against southpaws are a .289 batting average and .717 OPS. As I pointed out earlier, a platoon of Walker and Harrison at second base makes a lot of sense. Walker's already played more games this year than any season since 2011, so he's not exactly getting phased out. Second, non-tendering means not offering a player a contract--in effect, releasing him. I don't see any way that the Pirates would non-tender Walker; that's what you do with filler-type guys who have no role with your club and don't have a lot of value to other clubs. Trading him, though, that's another story.

That prompted another Tribune-Review writer, Rob Rossi, to opine "What A Joke It Would Be If the Pirates Let Walker Go." His argument: Walker, a Pittsburgh native, is not only one of the best second basemen in the game, but he's also a key member of the franchise and the community, and the Pirates should do what it takes to keep him. He suggests four years, $46 million. 

I've given you the link to Rossi's article, so you can see what you think of it. (Not relevant to anything here, but Rossi wrote, "Walker might be the Pirates' best second baseman since Bill Mazeroski." Um, Johnny Ray says hello.) I want to focus on his idea of a four year, $46 million contact.

First, let's take a look at the Pirates who can become free agents in the next few seasons. I'm going to list them by year and their age at the start of their free agency seasons:

• 2016: Pitcher Anthony Bastardo (30), infielder Sean Rodriguez (30), pitcher Joakim Soria (31), pitcher J.A. Happ (33), first baseman Corey Hart (34). (I'm assuming A.J. Burnett and Aramis Ramirez stick to their guns and retire.)
• 2017: Outfielder Travis Snider (29), first baseman Pedro Alvarez (30), catcher Francisco Cervelli (31), Walker (31), pitcher Mark Melancon (32), first baseman Travis Ishikawa (33), catcher Chris Stewart (35), first baseman Mike Morse (35)
• 2018: Pitcher Tony Watson (33), pitcher Francisco Liriano (34), pitcher Charlie Morton (34).

You figure the Pirates are going to want to keep some of those guys, right? Rodriguez and Happ out of next year's class, Cervelli and maybe Melancon the following year, possibly all three of the 2018 pitchers, if they're healthy. Now, I don't care how much a player makes, nor how much a multimillionaire spends on his team. You can make an argument that a player like Andrew McCutchen is worth $30 million per year, and if he makes that, more power to him; if Pirates owner Bob Nutting spends that much, it's not my money. But the Pirates have to have some sort of budget, I figure, and that budget will limit how much they can spend on players. Paying a lot of money for a player is relevant only if it prevents a team from being able to afford other players.

So does spending $46 million for four years of Walker make sense? Without even looking at the dollars, let's look at age. Walker will be 30 at the start of next year, so the Pirates would be signing him for his age 30, 31, 32, and 33 seasons. Walker's a good-hitting second baseman--above-average park-adjusted OPS every year he's been in the majors--whose bat carries his adequate glove. How realistic is it to expect him to stay in the lineup and keep up his above-average hitting in his thirties?

To answer this, I looked at every second baseman who qualified for the batting championship since 2000. Here are the regular (defined as 75% of their games played at second) second baseman with an above-average OPS in their 30s:

• Age 30: Ronnie Belliard, Robinson Cano, Mark Ellis, Aaron Hill, Tadahito Iguchi, Howie Kendrick, Jeff Keppinger, Brandon Phillips, Brian Roberts, Dan Uggla, Chase Utley, Ben Zobrist (12 total)
• Age 31: Robinson Cano, Orlando Hudson, Ian Kinsler, Mark Loretta, Placido Polanco, Brian Roberts, Dan Uggla, Chase Utley (8 total)
• Age 32: Roberto Alomar, Bret Boone, Robinson Cano, Ray Durham, Jeff Kent, Mark Loretta, Placido Polanco, Ben Zobrist (8 total)
• Age 33: Roberto Alomar, Bret Boone, Ray Durham, Mark Grudzielanek, Jeff Kent, Ian Kinsler (6 total)

In the past 16 seasons, no regular second baseman who's been in the lineup enough to qualify for the batting title has been an above-average hitter every year between ages 30 and 33. Robinson Cano, who's 32, is three quarters of the way there, but he's the only second baseman to appear on the list three times. In other words, he is the only regular second baseman in this century to have been an above-average hitter in more than half of the four years between age 30 and 33. Chase Utley put up consistently good numbers, but he missed 47 games when he was 31, 59 when he was 32, and 79 when he was 33, so qualified for the batting title only twice. Ben Zobrist was an above-average hitter who qualified for the batting title every year but he played only 58 games at second when he was 31 and 79 games there when he was 33. The combination of staying healthy and staying good, it seems, starts and ends with one second baseman, Robinson Cano, with an honorable mention to Ben Zobrist.

So does a four-year contract for a 30 year old second baseman who's good, but obviously not quite Robinson Cano, make a lot of sense, regardless of money? No, it probably doesn't. And the conviction behind that "probably" increases if the contract sucks up so much payroll money that it prevents the team from affording younger or better players. 

Look, I like Walker. He really is one of the best second basemen in the game; I'd put him in the top ten or so. But as he ages, his defense isn't going to get better, his offense is likely to decline, and he's likely to start missing time. If the Pirates can sign him to, say, three years with a hometown discount, fine. I think Harrison makes more sense as a super-utility guy than an everyday second basemen anyway. But blowing a lot of money on a lot of years of Walker seems counter-productive, his place of birth notwithstanding.

Michael Cuddyer and the Case for American League Superiority

Two facts:

• Outfielder Michael Cuddyer was one of twelve major league free agents to receive a qualifying offer from his club. He rejected the opportunity to earn $15.3 million playing for the Rockies in 2015 and instead accepted a two-year contract with the Mets that will pay him $21 million: $8.5 million in 2015 and $12.5 million in 2016.
• In 2014 the American League went 163-137 in interleague games, a .543 winning percentage. The AL won the interleague series in 2013 as well, going 154-146 (.513). It was better in 2012. And 2011. And 2010. And every year beginning in 2004. (The last time the National League won the interleague series, The Curse of the Bambino was a thing and Alex Rodriguez was a shortstop for the Rangers.) And other than that first year, when the AL squeaked to a 127-125 edge, it hasn't been particularly close. Through the league's 11-year winning streak, it's won 55.4% of interleague games. Over a 162-game season, that's equivalent to going 90-72, a better record than either of the teams in this year's World Series.

I view these as interreleated.

Let's start with Cuddyer. In order to understand what he did, let's divide everything by 200 to get the dollars to regular-person levels. Say you're weighing two job opportunities. Your compensation is salary plus commission or bonus, so as is customary in such setups, you get an offer that guarantees you a fixed amount for the first year or two. One employer offers you $76,500 for one year. The other offers you two years: One at $42,500 and one at $62,500. Which do you take?

I would imagine that unless the benefits are insanely good, you don't even consider the second offer. Of course you take the first one. Your guaranteed contract should represent your employer's best guess of what you can make at the company, and the first employer figures you can generate enough business to pull in at least $76,500. The second employer thinks you're worth $14,000 less. No contest.

So why would Michael Cuddyer turn down a contract that would pay him $15.3 million for one year in favor of one that would pay him just $5.7 more than that for two years? Because his expectations aren't the same as yours. You figure that if you make $76,500 with your new employer next year, you'll make at least that much, and very possibly more, the year after, and at least that much the year after that, for years and years into the future. 

Michael Cuddyer, by contrast, has no such expectations. He'll turn 36 next March. He played only 49 games last year due to injuries. There's a small, but non-negligible chance, that next season will be his last in the majors. There's another chance, larger than the first, that something will happen next year--another serious injury, a lousy season--that will make his salary prospects for 2016 tenuous. Look, the Phillies just signed Jeff Francoeur to a minor-league contract with a chance to make the club out of spring training. Francouer is five years younger than Cuddyer and was the Royals' starting right fielder, pulling down $6 million, in 2012. He earned $7.5 million in 2013. Now he's a long shot to get a job. That's the difference between athletes and us. We have a pretty reasonable expectation that whatever we're doing for work this year, whether we're a lawyer or an accountant or a plumber or whatever, we'll be doing it for years to come. An athlete's career is short to start out with, and it can end suddenly. That's why, year after year, we see athletes sign contracts that emphasize length and total dollars rather than average annual value. Cuddyer preferred the Mets' offer of two years and $21 million ($10.5 million per year, on average) over the Rockies' one and $15.3 million because it guarantees him another year of employment and $5.7 million more. Players will reject an x-year contract for an average y million dollars per year in favor of one with a higher x and a lower y. Last year, for example, Robinson Cano reportedly rejected a seven-year contract from the Yankees that would reportedly pay him an average of $25 million per year in favor of a ten-year deal with Seattle that pays him an average of $24 million per year. 

That player preference helps the American League. If players like longer contracts because it insulates them from the risk of a loss of effectiveness, that risk gets absorbed by the team signing a player for multiple years. The Mets are on the hook to Cuddyer in 2016 if he turns into a pumpkin in 2015. The longer the contract, the greater the risk. 

That's where the difference between the leagues comes into play. The American League has a designated hitter; the National League doesn't. A position player, as he ages, is going to become a poorer fielder. His reflexes and range will diminish. In some cases, that means he'll move from a tough position like second base to an easier one like first base, as Hall of Famer Rod Carew did. But in a lot of cases, especially those of sluggers, he'll leave his glove in his locker and just become a designated hitter. In David Ortiz's rookie season with the Twins in 1998, he was the team's primary first baseman, playing 70 games there. He's played a total of 57 games at first for the Red Sox over the past ten years as Boston's  DH. Tigers DH Victor Martinez was primarily a position player from 2002 to 2010. He didn't became a DH until he was 32. 

This creates an advantage for the American League when hitters become free agents. Players want long contracts, teams don't. But the American League can realistically get production out of a player longer than a National League team can, because the American League team can move the player to DH. David Ortiz would probably not have a job with a National League team; he's pretty useless in the field. But he was ninth in the American League in on base plus slugging this year, earning $15 million. He'll turn 39 next week. The option of becoming a DH means that American League teams can offer players like Ortiz longer contracts than can their National League counterparts. Seattle's second baseman Cano will be 40 in the last year of the contract he signed last winter with the Mariners; he'll almost certainly be playing at least part-time at DH before then. American League sluggers tend to stay in the league, and National League sluggers are drawn to the American League for the same reason: American League teams can offer them longer contracts, because they can shift them to DH late in their career. The two best National League hitters in this year's free agent class are the Dodgers' Hanley Ramirez and the Giants' Pablo Sandoval. Ramirez is viewed as a so-so shortstop, and Sandoval, while a good third baseman, has a body type (i.e., he's fat) that might not lend itself to a long career in the field. How much do you want to bet that one or both winds up in the AL? On the other side , the two best AL hitters are the Tigers' Martinez and the Orioles' Nelson Cruz. They're both primarily DHs. Martinez has already re-signed with Detroit, and Cruz is virtually certain to stay in the league. Albert Pujols (went from the Cardinals to the Angels), Prince Fielder (went from the Brewers to the Tigers), Vladimir Guerrero (went from the Expos to the Angels)...the American League steadily draws free agent power hitters from the National League, and there is almost no movement the other way.

Because of the DH, the American League draws power-hitting talent from the National League while retaining its own. That'll help keep it ahead in the interleague standings. The example of Cuddyer isn't perfect--he's a National League hitter staying in the National League--but it's instructive.

There Is No Parity Between the Leagues

Over the weekend there was an article in the weekend Wall Street Journal (may be behind a paywall) pointing out that the American League has prevailed in interleague games for ten straight years and appears certain to do so this year as well. In seeking to explain it, the Journal points to the designated hitter:

Because of the DH, AL teams can more easily acquire offensive-minded players without worrying about their negative impact on defense.

That's true, but let me add a couple other factors. First, the presence of a DH allows American League teams to sign long-term contracts to free agent hitters who, by the time their contract expires, probably won't be suited to play in the field. Albert Pujols is the Angels' first baseman. He is 34 and under contract through 2021. Prince Fielder, until a season-ending injury, was the Rangers' first baseman. He is 30 and under contract through 2020. Do you think Albert Pujols will be a first baseman when he's 41, or Prince Fielder when he's 36, especially since both players have battled injuries in recent years? Or consider the past winter's marquee free agent, Robinson Cano. He's 31 and plays second for the Mariners. Plays it well, I might add--he ranks highly in both traditional and advanced fielding metrics. But he's also signed through 2023, when he'll be 40. Doesn't it seem likely that by then he'll be at least a part-time DH by then? National League teams can't sign batters to those kind of contracts, because by the end of the contract, there won't be anywhere on the field to play them. Fine with us, fans of National League teams might say, given that paying Pujols $30 million in 2021, or Fielder $24 million in 2020, or Cano $24 million in 2023, is likely a money-losing proposition in terms of return on investment. But in avoiding those high-cost out years, National League teams are missing out on the near-term years when the players are good. That tilts the balance of power to the American League.

Here's another, mundane reason: The average American League payroll is $109.8 million. The average National League payroll is $104.9 million. (Both figures from baseball-reference.com) Might it be that the American League is better because they pay more and therefore get better players? And before you can say "Red Sox and Yankees," if you exclude those two teams from the AL totals and the Dodgers from the NL, American League teams still have a higher average payroll, $98.9 million to $97.2 million. 

2014 Predictions: AL West

As Yogi Berra is alleged to have said, it's tough to make predictions, especially about the future. These predictions for upcoming season are going to be pretty quick and dirty. You don't want to spend a lot of time reading them anyway, do you? Unlike other prognosticators, though, I'll revisit these to see how badly I did.

Since baseball games are the product of runs scored and runs allowed, I'm going to focus on those two metrics in developing my 2014 predictions. Here's the National League West, Central, and East along with the American League Central and East. 

Oakland Athletics - 96-66 in 2013, 4.7 runs scored per game (4th in MLB), 3.9 runs allowed per game (9th in MLB): I always get the feeling that the A's are just a couple steps ahead of the posse. In the Moneyball era, they had a lot of guys who got on base a lot; now everyone's doing it. Last year they emphasized pitchers who give up fly balls and batters who hit them; probably the league catches up to them on that as well. They've won more games over the past two years than any team in the American League. I think it's going to be hard to keep that streak going. Prediction: More runs scored and allowed, 91-71.

Texas Rangers - 91-72, 4.5 runs scored per game (8th in MLB), 3.9 runs allowed per game (10th in MLB): The Rangers made a couple huge offseason deals, signing on-base machine Shin-Soo Choo to lead off and trading second baseman Ian Kinsler for lefty slugger Prince Fielder. The trade of Kinsler opens up second to Jurickson Profar, a highly-touted prospect who disappointed last year, compiling an OPS that was 24% below the league average (adjusting for his home park), but Profar turned 21 only last month (though he's out with a shoulder injury). The pitching staff is a worry, with last year's Cy Young runner-up followed by a bunch of guys with injury problems. Prediction: More runs scored and allowed,  89-73.

Los Angeles Angels - 78-84, 4.5 runs scored per game (7th in MLB), 4.5 runs allowed per game (24th in MLB): Albert Pujols is apparently recovered from his foot problems, Josh Hamilton was OK in the second half of last season, and they still have Mike Trout. Pitching was the problem last year, and they added youngster Tyler Skaggs and  lefty Hector Santiago in the trade for Mark Trumbo. When this team plopped down all that money on Pujols, C.J. Wilson, and Hamilton, they thought they were buying pennants. They didn't, but I think they're getting closer. Prediction: More runs scored and allowed, 83-79.

Seattle Mariners - 71-91, 3.9 runs scored per game (22nd in MLB), 4.7 runs allowed per game (26th in MLB): You might have heard that they signed former Yankees 2B Robinson Cano, one of the best players in baseball. Other than that, their deals were minor, and Hisashi Iwakuma, who finished third in the Cy Young voting, is out with a strained tendon in the middle finger of his pitching hand. Prediction: More runs scored and allowed, 76-86.

Houston Astros - 51-111, 3.8 runs scored per game (26th in MLB), 5.2 runs allowed per game (30th in MLB): It's tempting to look at last year's team and just say, "Well, they can't be much worse." I think they'll do better than that. They added CF Dexter Fowler via trade and starting pitchers Scott Feldman and Jerome Williams via free agency. The Astros also have a lot of strong prospects whom we'll likely see later in the season. Prediction: More runs scored, fewer allowed, 56-106.

What Happens When a Pitch is Thrown, Part 4 - Hey Batter Batter

We've established that for pitchers, throwing strikes is good, but getting strikes, from a combination of pitching in the strike zone and inducing swings outside the zone, is better. So let's find out whether the opposite is true for hitters: Do the best hitters avoid strikes, especially outside the strike zone?

When we looked at pitchers, we evaluated them based on ERA, WHIP (baserunners per inning), and percentage of batters getting strikeouts, walks, and home runs. For batters, let's keep the last three, but instead of the pitcher-oriented ERA and WHIP we'll use batting average, on base percentage, and slugging percentage.

Before I start, let me explain one tweak I did to the data: For pitchers, I included every pitch thrown in the majors last year. For batters, I'm going to exclude plate appearances by pitchers. I'm doing this for two reasons. First, pitchers are remarkably terrible hitters. They batted .132 with a .164 on base percentage and .169 slugging percentage last year. No position players come close to those numbers. Second, they screw up my analysis of balls and strikes. In looking at the numbers, I discovered there are two strategies when a pitcher's at the plate:

1. Throw everything in the strike zone, then laugh derisively as they helplessly flail away.
2. Throw everything outside the strike zone, then laugh derisively as they helplessly flail away.

That means that pitchers' at bats make batters who get a lot of pitches in the strike zone, and those who swing at a lot of pitches outside the strike zone, appear worse than they otherwise would be. So I'm excluding them. In terms of numbers, that means I'm ignoring 19,171 of the 709,916 pitches that were thrown last year. Given that that's only 2.7% of the total, I don't think we're missing much.

How are strikes and batting performance related? We'll start by looking at all strikes: pitches in the strike zone and pitches outside the strike zone at which the batter swings. We're checking to see whether batters with a lot of strikes do poorly. I ranked all batters by percentage of pitches to them that were strikes, and divided into ten groups. Group 1 got the fewest strikes, Group 2 the second fewest, Group 3 the third fewest...you get it. Group 10 had the highest percentage of strikes. Here's how they did:
     Group   BA   OBP   SLG    K%    BB%   HR%
       1   .254  .361  .433  21.1%  13.6%  3.4%
       2   .266  .353  .438  19.6%  11.1%  3.2%
       3   .256  .332  .404  19.3%   9.5%  2.5%
       4   .259  .332  .421  20.6%   9.3%  3.0%
       5   .267  .332  .431  19.2%   8.4%  3.0%
       6   .260  .319  .399  18.8%   7.6%  2.4%
       7   .255  .309  .381  17.8%   6.8%  1.9%
       8   .249  .301  .382  18.5%   6.3%  2.4%
       9   .252  .298  .383  19.5%   5.4%  2.2%
      10   .252  .288  .371  19.2%   4.0%  1.9%

Three reactions to this list. First, if you ignore batting average (which you should, since on base percentage and slugging percentage, as I showed, are better tied to run production), the relationship still holds: the more strikes a batter gets as a percentage of pitches, the worse the batter performs. It's not a flawless relationship, but it's good enough. Second, the batters who get the fewest strikes have the best home run percentages. Remember how that's not true for pitchers. But you can imagine a patient hitter like Joey Votto or Mike Trout or David Ortiz (they're all in Group 1) picking through pitches, waiting for one he can drive. Third, and this is counter-intuitive, the batters who get the lowest percentage of strikes nonetheless manage to strike out more often than anyone else. More on that in a bit.


How are pitches in the strike zone and batting performance related? Remember that pitchers who got more pitches in the strike zone did better than pitchers who didn't. The opposite for batting should be that batters who get the fewest pitches in the strike zone should do better than batters who don't. Here are the numbers:
     Group   BA   OBP   SLG    K%    BB%   HR%
       1   .258  .332  .438  21.6%   9.2%  3.5%
       2   .260  .328  .437  20.3%   8.5%  3.6%
       3   .257  .327  .408  18.6%   8.8%  2.7%
       4   .263  .333  .426  19.8%   9.1%  3.0%
       5   .255  .326  .399  19.9%   8.7%  2.5%
       6   .258  .320  .393  19.6%   7.6%  2.3%
       7   .267  .330  .415  18.9%   8.0%  2.5%
       8   .249  .308  .387  19.5%   7.3%  2.4%
       9   .255  .314  .370  17.8%   7.0%  1.7%
      10   .247  .301  .358  17.5%   6.5%  1.7%

Yes, the relationship holds, though it's not super strong. But hang on, think about it...this is kind of a trick question. Throwing balls into the strike zone is skill. Some pitchers possess it in greater quantities than others. But a batter getting pitches in the strike zone...not a skill. They're just standing there. Unless they get into an extreme Rickey Henderson-style crouch or something, there's nothing a batter can do to influence how many pitches go into the strike zone. Except, of course, by being good. Pitchers are going to pitch a lot more carefully to a slugger than a utility infielder. As a result, we should expect the very best hitters to get the fewest pitches in the strike zone. The table above illustrates that that's how it works. Groups 1 and 2 include guys like Giancarlo Stanton and Paul Goldschmidt. Group 10 has Clint Barmes and Pete Kozma. 

How are swings at pitches outside the strike zone and batting performance related? Strikes are the sum of pitches in the strike zone and pitches outside the strike zone at which the batter swings. For batters, getting pitches in the strike zone isn't a skill, but not swinging at pitches outside the zone is. Do batters who don't swing at pitches outside the strike zone do better than those who do? As usual, Group 1 represents the 10% of players who swing the least frequently at pitches outside the strike zone, and Group 10 represents the 10% who swing the most:

     Group   BA   OBP   SLG    K%    BB%   HR%
       1   .249  .342  .391  20.0%  11.6%  2.4%
       2   .262  .346  .436  19.1%  10.7%  2.7%
       3   .256  .331  .399  18.4%   9.5%  2.4%
       4   .256  .324  .396  19.3%   8.5%  2.3%
       5   .254  .322  .397  19.7%   8.4%  2.5%
       6   .256  .320  .412  19.1%   8.0%  3.0%
       7   .260  .314  .392  17.8%   6.8%  2.3%
       8   .264  .323  .426  20.4%   7.3%  3.0%
       9   .255  .301  .395  19.4%   5.6%  2.5%
      10   .257  .298  .406  20.3%   4.8%  2.8%

Certainly, the batters who swing don't swing at pitches outside the strike zone have a better on base percentage, because they walk more. But they don't appear to strike out less, hit with more power, or hit more homers.

So we've got a paradox: Good pitchers get batters to swing at pitches outside the strike zone, but swinging at pitches outside the strike zone doesn't appear to hurt batters other than to limit their walks. Why is that?

I think the answer is that good hitters have a sweet spot, and if the sweet spot is outside the strike zone, so be it. Group 1 here--batters who don't swing at pitches outside the strike zone--include bat-control guys who don't have a lot of power, like Marco Scutaro and Nate McLouth. Group 10 has several hitters who hit the ball hard but swing at most anything, like Mark Trumbo and Adam Jones. And All-Stars like Robinson Cano, Carlos Gonzalez, and Freddie Freeman swing at an above-average number of pitches outside the strike zone as well. 

So let's reiterate the paradoxical conclusion: Good pitchers get batters to swing at pitches outside the strike zone, but swinging at pitches outside the strike zone doesn't appear to hurt batters other than to limit their walks. Seems to me that if you don't like watching strikeouts, there's nothing to suggest things are going to get much better.

Robinson Cano and the Yankees

I hit up the Mariners' $240 million, 10-year free agent contract with Robinson Cano earlier. There are two implications of this deal for the Yankees, as I see it.

• The Bombers have a somewhat unfair reputation for "buying pennants." There was a time when they signed high-priced star free agents by the armload. But there really hasn't been that much of that recently; the last two splurges were CC Sabathia and Mark Teixeira, and that was five years ago. (Yes, I know, Brian McCann and Jacoby Ellsbury signed big contracts, but they are not stars like CC and Tex were.) What the Yankees have done, though, is retain their key players, most famously Jeter, Rivera, Pettite, and Posada. Can you remember the Yankees losing their best hitter, in his prime, to free agency? I can't.
• The Yankees' window for buying pennants has probably closed, anyway. As Joe Sheehan pointed out in a brilliant piece in his newsletter Thursday (subscription required, and it's worth it), top young stars hardly ever hit free agency in their prime anymore; their teams have them locked up. Think of Evan Longoria, Andrew McCutchen, Troy Tulowitzki--all have long-term contracts with their teams. So even if they wanted to, the Yankees can't buy a pennant anymore by waiting for young stars to hit free agency after six years. So they need to keep core players like the one who just got away.

Robinson Cano, Piling On

Via Twitter, of course:

Cano signing this contract cements his status as the opening day DH for the 2024 Yankees.
— Cespedes Family BBQ (@CespedesBBQ) December 6, 2013

Robinson Cano, Future Ancient Mariner

The Seattle Mariners have signed former Yankees second baseman Robinson Cano to a ten-year, $240 million contract. Second base is a tough position. A lot of guys don't last long there. Among Hall of Famers, Rogers Hornsby's and Jackie Robinson's last full years at the position were at age 33. Roberto Alomar's was at 35. Rod Carew moved over to first when he was 30. A couple Yankees: Joe Gordon was 35 during his last season, and Tony Lazzeri played only 81 games past his 33rd birthday. 

Cano will be 40 in the last year of his contract. Here's a list of players since 1901 who played 120 or more games at second at age 38 or more:

Player	OPS	G	Year	Age	Tm	AB	R	H	2B	3B	HR	RBI	BB	SO	SB	CS	BA	OBP	SLG
Jeff Kent	.875	136	2007	39	LAD	494	78	149	36	1	20	79	57	61	1	3	.302	.375	.500
Joe Morgan	.838	134	1982	38	SFG	463	68	134	19	4	14	61	85	60	24	4	.289	.400	.438
Nap Lajoie	.802	137	1913	38	CLE	465	66	156	25	2	1	68	33	17	17		.335	.398	.404
Craig Biggio	.792	155	2005	39	HOU	590	94	156	40	1	26	69	37	90	11	1	.264	.325	.468
Davey Lopes	.764	147	1983	38	OAK	494	64	137	13	4	17	67	51	61	22	4	.277	.341	.423
Craig Biggio	.727	145	2006	40	HOU	548	79	135	33	0	21	62	40	84	3	2	.246	.306	.422
Frank White	.635	135	1989	38	KCR	418	34	107	22	1	2	36	30	52	3	2	.256	.307	.328
Kid Gleason	.604	155	1905	38	PHI	608	95	150	17	7	1	50	45	45	16		.247	.302	.303
Rabbit Maranville	.579	149	1932	40	BSN	571	67	134	20	4	0	37	46	28	4		.235	.295	.284
Kid Gleason	.550	135	1906	39	PHI	494	47	112	17	2	0	34	36	29	17		.227	.281	.269
Rabbit Maranville	.539	143	1933	41	BSN	478	46	104	15	4	0	38	36	34	2		.218	.274	.266
Bobby Lowe	.494	141	1904	38	TOT	507	47	105	14	6	0	40	17	44	15		.207	.236	.258

Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Play Index Tool Used

Generated 12/6/2013.

That's just nine players in baseball history: Craig Biggio, Kid Gleason, Jeff Kent, Nap Lajoie, Davey Lopes, Bobby Lowe, Rabbit Maranville, Joe Morgan, and Frank White. And of those, there were only five seasons (the first five listed above) in which the old guy at second was a decent offensive contributor. 

Of course, this contract isn't about Cano's 2021-2023 seasons. It's about a Mariners team that was 12th of the 15 teams in the AL at run production adding the best-hitting second baseman in baseball to its lineup in 2014. Or, put another way, Seattle's second basemen posted a .214/.289/.330 slash line (batting average, on base percentage, slugging percentage). Cano's was .314/.383/.516. This is a big upgrade for a team with deep pockets. They have plenty of offensive holes elsewhere to fill, but this is a splashy start.