Trailing 30 - September 6

Here is an explanation of this weekly feature, listing the best and worst of past 30 days, made possible by FanGraphs' Leaders application. Comment for the week: Take a look at the top five and bottom five in the American League in batting average. At the beginning of the season, wouldn't you have been unsurprised if, at some point, those lists had been reversed? Well, maybe not Miguel Cabrera, and Alex Rodriguez's high-average days are probably behind him, but those are two pretty topsy-turvy lists.

   American League              National League

   Team W-L                     Team W-L      

1. Toronto         19- 6     1. Chicago         18- 9

2. Kansas City     19- 9        St. Louis       18- 9    

3. Texas           17-10     3. Pittsburgh      18-10         

4. Cleveland       16-11     4. New York        17-10   

   Minnesota       16-11     5. Los Angeles     15-12        

   Worst Team W-L               Worst Team W-L

1. Detroit          9-18     1. Atlanta          5-22      

2. Baltimore       10-18     2. Cincinnati       7-21       

3. Oakland         10-16     3. Colorado        11-18      

4. Los Angeles     11-17     4. San Francisco   11-17
5. Chicago         13-15     5. Philadelphia    11-16

   Batting Average              Batting Average     

1. Bradley, Bos     .402     1. Peralta, Ari     .381  

2. Brantley, Cle    .392     2. Pollock, Ari     .364      

3. Lindor, Cle      .390     3. Votto, Cin       .356           

4. Cabrera, Det     .380     4. McCutchen, Pit   .354          

5. Ortiz, Bos       .371     5. Piscotti, SL     .352       

   Lowest Batting Average       Lowest Batting Average  

1. Rodriguez, NY    .143     1. Bruce, Cin       .142         

2. Gomez, Hou       .187     2. Peterson, Atl    .172       

3. Sandoval, Bos    .190     3. Uribe, NY        .187
4. Plouffe, Min     .196     4. Byrd, Cin-SF     .200           

5. V Martinez, Det  .200     5. Schwarber, Chi   .202      

   On Base Percentage           On Base Percentage  

1. Bradley, Bos     .456     1. Votto, Cin       .532           

   Cabrera, Det     .456     2. Harper, Was      .496         

3. Zobrist, KC      .452     3. McCutchen, Pit   .466         

4. Brantley, Cle    .439     4. Fowler, Chi      .440          

5. Lindor, Cle      .437     5. d'Arnaud, NY     .426      

      

   Slugging Percentage          Slugging Percentage   

1. Bradley, Bos     .841     1. Zimmerman, Was   .7113        

2. Encarnacion, Tor .803     2. Votto, Cin       .7111    

3. Ortiz, Bos       .775     3. Gonzalez, Col    .696       

4. Sano, Min        .670     4. Fowler, Chi      .677       

5. Davis, Bal       .660     5. Arenado, Col     .675        

          

   Home Runs                    Home Runs

1. Davis, Bal         12     1. Gonzalez, Col      14
2. Sano, Min          10     2. Cespedes, NY       11        

3. Encarnacion, Tor    9     3. Arenado, Col       10
   Ortiz, Bos          9     4. Zimmerman, Was      9
5. 4 with              8     5. 3 with              8

   Runs                         Runs    

1. Bradley, Bos       28     1. Harper, Was        28        

2. Donaldson, Tor     25     2. Pollock, Ari       24     

3. Davis, Bal         22        Votto, Cin         24
   Escobar, Min       22     4. Cespedes, NY       23
5. 2 with             21     5. 3 with             22

   RBI                          RBI      

1. Donaldson, Tor     31     1. Zimmerman, Was     34        

2. Encarnacion, Tor   28     2. Kemp, SD           30      

3. Bradley, Bos       26     3. Gonzalez, Col      29       

4. Sano, Min          25     4. Arenado, Col       25
5. 2 with             23     5. Bryant, Chi        24
                             

   Stolen Bases                 Stolen Bases             

1. Cain, KC            7     1. Gordon, Mia        13
2. Altuve, Hou         6     2. Pollock, Ari        9     

   Andrus, Tex         6     3. Blackmon, Col       7   

4. 3 with              5        Inciarte, Ari       7
                             5. 5 with              6
                                                     
   Saves                        Saves

1. Tolleson, Tex       9     1. Rosenthal, SL      10

2. Osuna, Tor          8     2. Melancon, Pit       9

3. Boxberger, TB       7        Rodriguez, Mil      9
   Wilhelmsen, Sea     7        Rondon, Chi         9
5. 6 with              6     5. 2 with              8

   ERA                          ERA

1. Fiers, Hou       0.67     1. Arrieta, Chi     0.42

2. Verlander, Det   0.76     2. Happ, Pit        0.60

3. Ventura, KC      1.13     3. Greinke, LA      1.31

4. McHugh, Hou      1.59     4. Kershaw, LA      1.57

5. Keuchel, Hou     1.77     5. Bumgarner, SF    1.69

   Worst ERA                    Worst ERA

1. Samardzija, Chi  7.13     1. Harang, Phi      8.13

2. Nova, NY         6.59     2. Niese, NY        7.06

3. Pelfrey, Min     6.35     3. Scherzer, Was    6.11

4. Santana, Min     6.15     4. Hand, Mia        5.94

5. Hernandez, Sea   6.03     5. Syndergaard, NY  5.53

   WHIP                         WHIP

1. Kluber, Cle      0.66     1. Arrieta, Chi     0.65

2. Tomlin, Cle      0.71     2. Iglesias, Cin    0.75
3. Verlander, Det   0.79     3. Bumgarner, SF    0.78

4. Fiers, Hou       0.81     4. Strasburg, Was   0.80
5. Holland, Tex     0.82     5. Greinke, LA      0.84

   Strikeouts                   Strikeouts

1. Sale, Chi          53     1. Kershaw, LA        59     

2. Price, Tor         47     2. Bumgarner, SF      52

3. Archer, TB         43     3. Iglesias, Cin      50

   Kluber, Cle        43     4. Arrieta, Chi       44

   Ventura, KC        43     5. Kennedy, SD        41

Gregory Polanco, Clutch Hitter?

Right fielder Gregory Polanco had a couple good games against the San Diego Padres:

• Tuesday, last of the eighth, game tied 2-2, two outs, runner on second, hit a triple to drive in the winning run in a 3-2 Pirates victory.
• Wednesday, last of the eighth, game tied 2-2, two outs, runner on first, hit a single to deep right to drive in the go-ahead run in a 5-2 Pirates victory.

Back-to-back games, he broke up tie games in the eighth inning with two outs. Clutch, right? 

But how do we balance this against his overall performance? Polanco's one of the more disappointing Pirates hitters. Called up in June last year, he famously hit in his first eleven straight games, batting .365 with a .421 on base percentage and .442 slugging percentage. But then pitchers figured him out, and he batted just .204/.282/.320 the rest of the way. This year, the heroics against the Padres notwithstanding, he's hit .233/.306/.338. Among 77 players who've qualified for the National League batting title, he's 71st in batting average, 59th in on base percentage, and 70th in slugging percentage. So has he been a weak hitter who rises to the occasion with the game on the line?

The answer to this question has long been the province of speculation. Yes, there's evidence that, say, David Ortiz is clutch, given his postseason heroics. (Though did you know that in late and close situations--seventh inning or later with his team leading by a run, tied, or has the tying run on base, at bat, or on deck--his career OPS of .870 is 50 points lower than his overall OPS of .920? That spread is larger than average. So, relatively speaking, he's kind of choked late and close. I didn't know that, either, until I just checked.) But often, who's clutch and who isn't is a matter of reputation. The best example is the two best shortstops of the last 20 years, guys named Jeter and Rodriguez, and their respective polar opposite clutch reputations. Is there a way of measuring this, as opposed to just going by narrative?

Yes, there is. Here's how: When Polanco stepped to the plate Tuesday night, with Steve Lombardozzi at second and two outs, the Pirates had a 57% chance of winning the game. The reason I say that is this: Historically, when the home team is tied with two outs in the eighth and a man on second, they wind up winning 57% of the time. That's not some the output of some advanced mathematical model; it's based on actual games. The probability of winning, when you're the home team and there's two outs in a tie game and a runner on second in the eighth inning, is 57%. After Polanco's triple, the Pirates had two outs in the eighth, a one-run lead, and a batter on third. The probability of winning in that situation is 87%. So Polanco increased the probability of winning by 30%. Wednesday, the situation was mostly similar: two outs, tie game, eighth inning, but there was a runner on first instead of second. The odds still said the Pirates would win, but since the baserunner was on first instead of second, the probability of winning was a little lower, 55% rather than Tuesday's 57%. Polanco drove in the run and wound up at second after the throw home. So now the Pirates had a one-run lead with two outs in the eighth, but a runner on second rather than at a third, as they had the night before. The probability of winning, though, was the same, 87%, as it was after his triple Tuesday. So on Wednesday, Polanco increased the Pirates' chance of winning by 32%.

You can do this with every play of the game. Take Wednesday's game. Polanco led off the home half of the first, Pirates trailing 1-0. He grounded out, reducing the team's odds of winning from 43% to 41%. In the bottom of third, with two outs, nobody on, and the Pirates down 2-1, he flew out, reducing the chance of winning from 37% to 36%. He came up in the same situation in sixth and lined out to right, reducing the Pirates' chances from 31% to 29%. (Why did the odds go down from 37% to 31% in the same situation, i.e. two outs and nobody on? Because the Pirates had more of a chance of coming back in the third inning than in the sixth.) Then he added 32% in the eighth, ending the game plus 27%; plus 0.275, to be exact. That figure--the 0.275 Polanco added to the Pirates' odds of winning the game--is called win probability added, or WPA for short. 

I think WPA is a fun number because it's a way of measuring clutch performance. Sticking with Wednesday's game, Polanco's go-ahead single added the most WPA, at 32%. But the second-biggest play was Neil Walker's double to lead off the Pirates' half of the seventh. At the time, the Pirates trailed 2-1. By getting into scoring position with no outs, Walker increased the Pirates' chance of winning, which was 34% with nobody out and nobody on, to 48% with nobody out and a runner in scoring position. He improved the Pirates winning probability by 14%. He eventually scored on a Francisco Cervelli groundout, but had he been stranded, he'd still get credit for increasing the Pirates' odds. That's what I like about WPA: It looks at every situation in a game, not just the ones on which runs score. If a player gets on base to put his team in position to win, he's helping the cause as much as his teammate who drives him in.

The clutchest Pirates game this year? It was the day before Polanco's heroics. In the second inning of Monday's Padres game, Pedro Alvarez grounded out with two outs and nobody on, the Pirates trailing 1-0. That reduced their winning probability from 39% to 38%. In the bottom of the fifth, still trailing 1-0, he grounded out again, this time with one out and nobody on. That reduced the odds from 36% to 34%. In the bottom of the seventh, still down 1-0, he came to the plate with two outs and runners on first and second. The Pirates' chance of winning was 33%. He got on by error, with McCutchen scoring and Cervelli going to third. Two outs, tie game, runners on first and third, home half of the seventh inning, the odds of winning jumped to 59%. So he added 26%. Then, in the last of the ninth, he came to the plate with two outs in a tie game, runners on first and third. The Pirates' chance of winning were 63%. Jung Ho Kang took second on defensive indifference, but that didn't materially increase the Pirates' odds; the lead runner, McCutchen on third, was all that mattered. Alvarez singled, winning the game, and increasing the Pirates' odds from 63% to, of course, 100%. Over the course of the game, he increased the Pirates' chance of winning by 63.1% and reduced it by 3.4% for a net of 59.7%, the highest Pirates WPA in one game this year. The worst WPA game of the year was Neil Walker's against the Twins on May 20. He grounded into a fielder's choice with none on in the first, grounded out with one out and nobody on in the third, lined into a double play with nobody out and a runner on first in the sixth, flew out leading off the eighth, struck out leading off the tenth, and lined out leading off the 13th. His 0-for-6 reduced the winning probability by 35.7% in aggregate. 

Now, WPA isn't perfect. Players on bad teams don't get much of a chance to increase their win probability added, as they don't come to bat in close games. As the example of Alvarez shows, WPA gives as much credit for a single as an error--it's all about how the play ended, not how it got there. But it's better than nothing, and pretty easy to understand.

So how clutch is Polanco? No very, it turns out. His WPA for the year is 0.29--barely positive, 50th in the league this year. The team leader, unsurprisingly, is Andrew McCutchen, at 2.72. Alvarez is second at 1.35. The trailer is shortstop Jordy Mercer, at -1.38. The top ten in the National League:

     Anthony Rizzo, Chicago       4.67

     Paul Goldschmidt, Arizona    4.53

     Bryce Harper, Washington     3.93

     Kris Bryant, Chicago         3.15

     Joey Votto, Cincinnati       2.73

     Andrew McCutchen, Pittsburgh 2.72

     Matt Carpenter, St. Louis    2.63

     Todd Frazier, Cincinnati     2.26

     Adrian Gonzalez, Los Angeles 2.22

     Justin Upton, San Diego      2.18

In a way, this is a little unsatisfying, in that WPA is pretty much telling us simply that the best hitters are the best clutch hitters too. The order's maybe a little surprising--the two first baseman at the top of the list have a pretty big lead, and the rookie Bryant's been really good--but overall, you're looking at ten All-Stars or near All-Stars there. 

Oh, and the Jeter vs. Rodriguez thing: The story is that Derek Jeter did little things to help the Yankees win: Get on base and move runners along, especially with the game on the line, while Alex Rodriguez did a lot of his damage in games that were already out of reach. WPA should capture that. A groundout to move a runner from first to second in the ninth inning of a tie game is more valuable than a three-run homer in a 8-1 game. What does WPA say?

Per 600 plate appearances, Jeter had 1.47 WPA over his career.

Per 600 plate appearances, Rodriguez has had 3.13 WPA over his career. That's more than twice Jeter's rate.

Snubs

You got a second? Open up another tab or window, pull up your favorite search engine, and type baseball all-star snubs 2015. You'll get a lot of hits! Just from perusing the search results, here are some of the players whose absence from the All-Star Game (at this point--there's still the Final Vote and the inevitable late injury substitutions):

• Clayton Kershaw, Dodgers pitcher
• Alex Rodriguez, Yankees DH
• Justin Turner, Dodgers third baseman
• Clay Buchholz, Red Sox pitcher
• Brian Dozier, Twins second baseman
• Brad Miller, Mariners shortstop
• Kolten Wong, Cardinals second baseman
• Brian McCann, Yankees catcher
• Xander Bogaerts, Red Sox shortstop

This isn't an exhaustive list. All I did was scroll through the first four pages of search results and pull names from the headlines. I didn't go into the many articles with lists of snubs. So there are undoubtedly more.

Now, Kershaw and Bogaerts could still make their respective teams via the Final Vote. But the other guys--yeah, the only way they're watching to All-Star Game is to score a ticket or tune into Fox next Tuesday.

My question is: How much of a snub is this, really?

I mean, there are guys who have money riding on this. Royals first baseman Eric Hosmer, who's going to the game, gets $50,000 for appearing. So I could see him being disappointed--feeling snubbed seems a bit strong--if he hadn't been chosen. His teammate, second baseman Omar Infante, who isn't going, would've gotten a $250,000 bonus in each of 2016 and 2017. That's a big chunk of cash (his base salary is $7.75 million in 2016 and $8 million in 2017), but it's hard to call a guy who's got a .246 on base percentage (lowest in the majors among 164 batting title qualifiers) and .309 slugging percentage (fourth lowest) snubbed. So yeah, if I'm Dozier or Wong, and my contract pays me extra for going to the All-Star game, I'd probably be annoyed.

But most players? I wonder whether the fans and media mythologize the All-Star Game a bit. I would imagine a player's first All-Star Game is a thrill. You bring your parents, maybe your siblings, your wife or girlfriend, probably your kids. You rub shoulders with all the big names. You get this cool All-Star uniform that you throw into your duffel bag right after the game, not knowing that MLB would have washed and sent it to you anyway. You probably lift the All-Star insignia notepads and pens from the conference room. All that sort of thing.

Once you've done one, though...Take Andrew McCutchen. This'll be his fifth straight All-Star Game. Yes, it's nice to get the recognition and all, but from his point of view, twenty of his teammates get the full All-Star break, four days off next week to relax, hang out with their families, ice down sore muscles, catch the matinee of Terminator: Genisys, and go out for dinner at a reasonable hour, while he spends Monday and Tuesday on the field and with the press. For the fifth straight year Cutch's break will be abbreviated. 

Baseball players have a tough job. Yes, they're playing a game for a living, but they play it 6-7 days per week for six months. That's seven and half including spring training, eight and a half including the postseason. They put in long hours at the office, with most games not ending until after 10 PM, and if they get a day off, it's always a Monday or Thursday and never a Friday, Saturday, or Sunday. Plus they're living out of a suitcase, on the road, half the time. I know that some of you are going to say, "Big deal, they're paid tons of money to do that," to which I'd reply, "I know, but that's not the point." I'm betting most of you would accept $10 million to step into the ring with Floyd Mayweather, but that doesn't mean his punches wouldn't hurt. Playing baseball pretty much every day for half the year, even if you love the game, is grueling. Think about the last time you had a big project at work that had you coming in over the weekend, then think how much you were dragging by the end of the next week. Then imagine that for 26 weeks. The four days of downtime that Pirates Neil Walker, Francisco Liriano, Tony Watson, Pedro Alvarez and sixteen other teammates will get has got to seem great to them. So yes, you could make a case for Pirates catcher Francisco Cervelli making his first All-Star team this year. Among NL catchers with 250 or more plate appearances, he's second in batting average, first in on base percentage, and third in slugging percentage. He also ranks second in Baseball Prospectus's measure for pitch framing, i.e. the ability to get umpires to call pitches on the outer edges of the strike zone strikes instead of balls. So going the All-Star Game would be pretty sweet. But given that we're in early July and he's already 30 games away from setting a career high in games played, at the toughest position on the diamond, I've got to think four days off will be pretty sweet too.

The Risk of Giancarlo Stanton

The Miami Marlins have signed their star right fielder, Giancarlo Stanton, to the longest and richest contract in baseball history: 13 years, $325 million. The 25-year-old Stanton can opt out of the deal after the 2020 season. We don't know the details of the contract, i.e. how the dollars are spread around over the years, but I'll go out on a limb and say that at an average value of $25 million per year, he's going to be paid a lot of money every season. Stanton, who turned 25 earlier this month, was an All-Star and finished second in MVP balloting in 2014, leading the National League in home runs (37), total bases (299), slugging percentage (.555), and, in a statement both of his talent and that of the Marlins lineup surrounding him, intentional walks (24). He's tied for tenth all time in home runs through age 24:

Rk	Player	HR	From	To	G	PA	AB	R	H	2B	3B	RBI	BB	SO	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS
1	Eddie Mathews	190	1952	1956	732	3141	2634	497	735	119	24	492	471	443	.279	.388	.559	.947
2	Alex Rodriguez	189	1994	2000	790	3515	3126	627	966	194	13	595	310	616	.309	.374	.561	.934
3	Mel Ott	176	1926	1933	983	3978	3367	680	1059	195	31	711	537	258	.315	.412	.548	.959
4	Jimmie Foxx	174	1925	1932	810	3270	2750	612	923	159	57	667	460	377	.336	.432	.625	1.056
5	Mickey Mantle	173	1951	1956	808	3491	2944	642	907	136	43	575	524	578	.308	.412	.560	.972
6	Ken Griffey	172	1989	1994	845	3606	3180	518	972	194	19	543	374	477	.306	.379	.541	.920
7	Frank Robinson	165	1956	1960	735	3155	2741	501	818	145	27	449	321	427	.298	.380	.552	.932
8	Albert Pujols	160	2001	2004	629	2728	2363	500	787	189	9	504	304	279	.333	.413	.624	1.037
9	Orlando Cepeda	157	1958	1962	764	3220	2987	471	922	163	16	553	172	463	.309	.350	.532	.881
10	Giancarlo Stanton	154	2010	2014	634	2640	2288	350	619	138	8	399	318	742	.271	.364	.540	.903
11	Johnny Bench	154	1967	1972	782	3229	2887	421	781	142	12	512	288	470	.271	.334	.488	.822

Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Play Index Tool Used

Generated 11/18/2014.

As you can see, he got there in fewer plate appearances than anyone on the list (among players with 100 or more homers through age 24, only Mathews, Pujols, Bob Horner, and Willie Mays went deep more often than Stanton's 5.8% of plate appearances), and he's also struck out more than the others. 

The contract has resulted in predictable reactions.

• It's too much money. Yes, it's the biggest contract in baseball history in total dollars, but not in average annual value. Miguel Cabrera, Clayton Kershaw, Alex Rodriguez, and Justin Verlander are in contracts that pay them more than an average of $25 million per year, and the $25 million average equals the current contracts of Ryan Howard, Josh Hamilton, and Felix Hernandez. There are players whom one might view as more valuable than Stanton (Mike Trout and Andrew McCutchen, to name two), but Stanton's contract isn't out of line with those of the players on the $25 million-plus list.
• No, I mean, it's too much money for a player. Sports Illustrated's Joe Sheehan has pointed out that the share of baseball revenues going to player salaries has steadily declined since the turn of the century. Given that no teams were going bankrupt in 2000, and that fans would probably rather watch Stanton hit than watch his owner, Jeffrey Loria, count money, I can't see a problem with the players getting a bigger slice of the pie.
• No, seriously, we can pay a baseball player that much and we can't pay schoolteachers and firefighters? This argument will make sense when kids walk around wearing their teachers' replica jerseys and firefighters negotiate with regional sports networks to televise their rescues.
• Thirteen years is too long. There's no question that's a risk. But Stanton will be 38 when his contract ends. Cabrera's will pay him at least through age 40, possibly a couple years longer, depending on options that vest based on his MVP vote. Rodriguez is under contract through age 41. Same with Albert Pujols. It's a long contract, but not ridiculously long. 
• He won't age well. Stanton is 6'6", 240. One could easily see him slowing down as he ages, moving from right to left to, eventually, first. He's in the National League, so he can't become a DH. But here's the thing: Historically, players with "old player skills" (home runs, walks, strikeouts) tend to flame out relatively early. Stanton last year was first in the National League in homers, second in walks, and sixth in strikeouts. On the other hand, Stanton is a good athlete. He grades out as an above-average right fielder and was 13-for-14 as a basestealer in 2014. He's not just a slugger.
• His owner's crazy. Well, that's true. He's "the most hated man in Major League Baseball." The Marlins' payroll last year was $42.4 million, last in the majors. The average annual value of Stanton's contract equals nearly 60% of that total. It doesn't make sense to pay that much to one guy while doing everything else on the cheap. Is this indicative of a willingness to spend? If so, the Marlins, who have a lot of promising young players, could contend. But we've been down this road before with Loria, when he added players after the 2011 season only to unload them after a disappointing 2012. But say this for Loria: His sins have consistently been of being penny-pinching, not profligate.

Rather, there are two things that I worry about with Stanton:

• Durability. Stanton's first full year in the majors was 2011. He played 150 games that year. He hasn't matched that total since. In 2012, he missed 39 games due to knee pain that required surgery in July. He also had oblique and shoulder injuries that year. He missed 46 games in 2013 due primarily to a strained hamstring but also with shoulder soreness and an ankle sprain. Last year he was healthy until September 12, when he was hit in the face by a Mike Fiers fastball in one of those can't-watch-it injuries, suffering multiple facial fractures. Hard tissue injuries (bones) tend to fully heal and are as much bad luck as anything. Soft tissue injuries (muscles, ligaments, tendons, cartilage) can be recurring. Toronto shortstop Jose Reyes, for example, has been on the disabled list five times, and day-to-day several other times, with hamstring problems. Stanton's been on the DL only twice in is career (the hit-by-pitch last year was in September, when teams don't bother disabling players), and he had a healthy 2014 until the Brewers' Fiers beaned him, but his record isn't scot-free. (All injury data from Baseball Prospectus.)
• Sustainability of revenues. The reason baseball revenues have grown dramatically in this century is television. With the proliferation of DVRs, consumers can record the programs they like and watch them when they want, fast-fowarding through the commercials. Sports are one of the few events consumers watch live. So they see the ads for beer and trucks and insurance while watching a game that they skip while watching sitcoms. That has made sports programming particularly valuable to advertisers and, therefore, for the networks that carry them. Additionally, TV broadcasting has shifted from national networks to regional sports networks (RSNs), like NESN in New England, YES and SNY in New York, and MASN in Baltimore/Washington. Teams have national contracts with ESPN and FOX, but they also have local contracts with RSNs that can dwarf the national contracts. Cable subscribers pay to have RSNs bundled with other channels. However, there's been a move to "unbundle" cable, letting consumers pick and choose the channels they want rather than the average of 189 that they receive now. Will your great aunt want ESPN, much less the RSNs, if she could pick her channels? And if she doesn't, and many others don't, what will happen to RSN revenues? The prospects for unbundling, as well as the savings it might yield, are unclear. But Stanton's contract assumes a stable economic model in baseball. In my role as a financial analyst, I've often said that Wall Street has a penchant for seeing a point and drawing a line through it. Baseball's doing the same thing with its current revenue mix. What works today may not in 2027, the last year of Stanton's contract.

Overall, I can't get too excited over Stanton's contract. Baseball's rolling in dough; might as well give it to a marquee player. I question what the Marlins have in mind longer term, and I worry about his injury risk, but the focus here's on the field of play anyway.

Michael Cuddyer and the Case for American League Superiority

Two facts:

• Outfielder Michael Cuddyer was one of twelve major league free agents to receive a qualifying offer from his club. He rejected the opportunity to earn $15.3 million playing for the Rockies in 2015 and instead accepted a two-year contract with the Mets that will pay him $21 million: $8.5 million in 2015 and $12.5 million in 2016.
• In 2014 the American League went 163-137 in interleague games, a .543 winning percentage. The AL won the interleague series in 2013 as well, going 154-146 (.513). It was better in 2012. And 2011. And 2010. And every year beginning in 2004. (The last time the National League won the interleague series, The Curse of the Bambino was a thing and Alex Rodriguez was a shortstop for the Rangers.) And other than that first year, when the AL squeaked to a 127-125 edge, it hasn't been particularly close. Through the league's 11-year winning streak, it's won 55.4% of interleague games. Over a 162-game season, that's equivalent to going 90-72, a better record than either of the teams in this year's World Series.

I view these as interreleated.

Let's start with Cuddyer. In order to understand what he did, let's divide everything by 200 to get the dollars to regular-person levels. Say you're weighing two job opportunities. Your compensation is salary plus commission or bonus, so as is customary in such setups, you get an offer that guarantees you a fixed amount for the first year or two. One employer offers you $76,500 for one year. The other offers you two years: One at $42,500 and one at $62,500. Which do you take?

I would imagine that unless the benefits are insanely good, you don't even consider the second offer. Of course you take the first one. Your guaranteed contract should represent your employer's best guess of what you can make at the company, and the first employer figures you can generate enough business to pull in at least $76,500. The second employer thinks you're worth $14,000 less. No contest.

So why would Michael Cuddyer turn down a contract that would pay him $15.3 million for one year in favor of one that would pay him just $5.7 more than that for two years? Because his expectations aren't the same as yours. You figure that if you make $76,500 with your new employer next year, you'll make at least that much, and very possibly more, the year after, and at least that much the year after that, for years and years into the future. 

Michael Cuddyer, by contrast, has no such expectations. He'll turn 36 next March. He played only 49 games last year due to injuries. There's a small, but non-negligible chance, that next season will be his last in the majors. There's another chance, larger than the first, that something will happen next year--another serious injury, a lousy season--that will make his salary prospects for 2016 tenuous. Look, the Phillies just signed Jeff Francoeur to a minor-league contract with a chance to make the club out of spring training. Francouer is five years younger than Cuddyer and was the Royals' starting right fielder, pulling down $6 million, in 2012. He earned $7.5 million in 2013. Now he's a long shot to get a job. That's the difference between athletes and us. We have a pretty reasonable expectation that whatever we're doing for work this year, whether we're a lawyer or an accountant or a plumber or whatever, we'll be doing it for years to come. An athlete's career is short to start out with, and it can end suddenly. That's why, year after year, we see athletes sign contracts that emphasize length and total dollars rather than average annual value. Cuddyer preferred the Mets' offer of two years and $21 million ($10.5 million per year, on average) over the Rockies' one and $15.3 million because it guarantees him another year of employment and $5.7 million more. Players will reject an x-year contract for an average y million dollars per year in favor of one with a higher x and a lower y. Last year, for example, Robinson Cano reportedly rejected a seven-year contract from the Yankees that would reportedly pay him an average of $25 million per year in favor of a ten-year deal with Seattle that pays him an average of $24 million per year. 

That player preference helps the American League. If players like longer contracts because it insulates them from the risk of a loss of effectiveness, that risk gets absorbed by the team signing a player for multiple years. The Mets are on the hook to Cuddyer in 2016 if he turns into a pumpkin in 2015. The longer the contract, the greater the risk. 

That's where the difference between the leagues comes into play. The American League has a designated hitter; the National League doesn't. A position player, as he ages, is going to become a poorer fielder. His reflexes and range will diminish. In some cases, that means he'll move from a tough position like second base to an easier one like first base, as Hall of Famer Rod Carew did. But in a lot of cases, especially those of sluggers, he'll leave his glove in his locker and just become a designated hitter. In David Ortiz's rookie season with the Twins in 1998, he was the team's primary first baseman, playing 70 games there. He's played a total of 57 games at first for the Red Sox over the past ten years as Boston's  DH. Tigers DH Victor Martinez was primarily a position player from 2002 to 2010. He didn't became a DH until he was 32. 

This creates an advantage for the American League when hitters become free agents. Players want long contracts, teams don't. But the American League can realistically get production out of a player longer than a National League team can, because the American League team can move the player to DH. David Ortiz would probably not have a job with a National League team; he's pretty useless in the field. But he was ninth in the American League in on base plus slugging this year, earning $15 million. He'll turn 39 next week. The option of becoming a DH means that American League teams can offer players like Ortiz longer contracts than can their National League counterparts. Seattle's second baseman Cano will be 40 in the last year of the contract he signed last winter with the Mariners; he'll almost certainly be playing at least part-time at DH before then. American League sluggers tend to stay in the league, and National League sluggers are drawn to the American League for the same reason: American League teams can offer them longer contracts, because they can shift them to DH late in their career. The two best National League hitters in this year's free agent class are the Dodgers' Hanley Ramirez and the Giants' Pablo Sandoval. Ramirez is viewed as a so-so shortstop, and Sandoval, while a good third baseman, has a body type (i.e., he's fat) that might not lend itself to a long career in the field. How much do you want to bet that one or both winds up in the AL? On the other side , the two best AL hitters are the Tigers' Martinez and the Orioles' Nelson Cruz. They're both primarily DHs. Martinez has already re-signed with Detroit, and Cruz is virtually certain to stay in the league. Albert Pujols (went from the Cardinals to the Angels), Prince Fielder (went from the Brewers to the Tigers), Vladimir Guerrero (went from the Expos to the Angels)...the American League steadily draws free agent power hitters from the National League, and there is almost no movement the other way.

Because of the DH, the American League draws power-hitting talent from the National League while retaining its own. That'll help keep it ahead in the interleague standings. The example of Cuddyer isn't perfect--he's a National League hitter staying in the National League--but it's instructive.