Yes, A.J. Burnett is Broken

Well, that may be my stupidest post of the year.

A week ago today, I asked whether A.J. Burnett was broken, as he'd given up as many earned runs in July as he had in any two prior months combined. My brilliant conclusion: 

Burnett's been throwing pretty much the same pitches, at the same velocities, to the same spots of late. However, he's facing tougher opponents than he did earlier in the year, and when batters make contact, they've been hitting the ball harder than in the past. There is also a fair amount of evidence that Burnett's been just unlucky of late, suggesting that he could rebound from his July performance.

So naturally, in his next start, three days later, he didn't make it out of the fifth inning, giving up ten hits and two walks in four and a third innings, charged with eight runs, seven of them earned. The next day, he was put on the disabled list with elbow inflammation. Today we learned that he has a strained flexor tendon, i.e. NOT the torn ulnar collateral ligament that necessitates Tommy John surgery, but still a serious injury, particularly for a guy who's 38. Burnett says that he's not going to go through surgery again, and if he can't come back this year, this is the end of the line for him.

Two thoughts. First, how did I manage to so thoroughly screw up my analysis? Well, as I noted, one of the markers for a physical problem is decreased velocity, and Burnett didn't show that...until his last start. Here's a graph showing his average velocity, by pitch type, for each of his starts in July, courtesy of Brooks Baseball:

Just focus on the solid lines. The velocities for his four-seam (straight) fastball (black line), sinking fastball (gray line), and curve ball (orange line) looked pretty consistent until the two fastballs fell off the table in his last start. He said that his elbow had been bothering him for a while, but also that he, like many pitchers, has dealt with elbow discomfort on and off throughout his career. Something clearly went south in that last start, and I had the misfortune of writing about Burnett shortly before.

Second, if this is the end of the road for Burnett, he'll retire with a 163-155 won-lost record and a 3.99 career ERA over 425 starts, during which he struck out 8.3 batters per nine innings and allowed 0.9 home runs per nine innings. Here is a list of pitchers with 400 or more starts with eight or more strikeouts per nine innings and one or fewer home runs per nine innings, ordered by career ERA:

Rk	Player	ERA	GS	SO/9	HR/9	W	L	W-L%	IP	H	R	ER	BB	SO	ERA+
1	Pedro Martinez	2.93	409	10.04	0.76	219	100	.687	2827.1	2221	1006	919	760	3154	154
2	Roger Clemens	3.12	707	8.55	0.66	354	184	.658	4916.2	4185	1885	1707	1580	4672	143
3	Nolan Ryan	3.19	773	9.55	0.54	324	292	.526	5386.0	3923	2178	1911	2795	5714	112
4	Randy Johnson	3.29	603	10.61	0.89	303	166	.646	4135.1	3346	1703	1513	1497	4875	135
5	Curt Schilling	3.46	436	8.60	0.96	216	146	.597	3261.0	2998	1318	1253	711	3116	127
6	David Cone	3.46	419	8.28	0.80	194	126	.606	2898.2	2504	1222	1115	1137	2668	121
7	A.J. Burnett	3.99	425	8.27	0.86	163	155	.513	2702.2	2490	1315	1198	1087	2484	103

Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Play Index Tool Used

Generated 8/3/2015.

Not a bad peer group. That's three current Hall of Famers, and at least two others who have the credentials, in my opinion. No, I'm not suggesting Burnett's as good as the other six; that 103 ERA+ means that his ERA over his career was only 3% better than league average, adjusted for home park, while all the others were a good deal better. But he's been a steady, durable above-average performer who had three of his best years while wearing a Pirates uniform.

My Team Went to the Trade Deadline and All I Got Was This Lousy Ramirez, Blanton, Soria, Happ, and Morse

I imagine some Pirates fans are disappointed by the team's trade deadline deals. Specifically, the team didn't land the big arms that got dealt (Johnny Cueto, Cole Hamels, Scott Kazmir, Mike Leake, Jonathan Papelbon, David Price) nor the big bats (Yoenis Cespedes, Carlos Gomez, Jose Reyes, Troy Tulowitzki, Ben Zobrist). But realistically, that probably wasn't going to happen. Here's why:

• The Pirates aren't looking to take on big salaries. Look, I think this is kind of a BS argument. The city of Detroit filed for bankruptcy, but the Detroit Tigers have the fifth-highest payroll in the majors. Is that because Detroit is a big-revenue market? Of course not; it means the team is owned by a zillionaire who's willing to spend many tens of millions on his baseball team. The Pirates aren't in the same situation, but it's not dictated by the population of Greater Pittsburgh. Whatever, given that constraint, Tulowitzki (will make a minimum of $98 million after this season), Hamels ($76.5 million), Reyes ($46 million) and even Papelbon ($11 million) weren't going to happen.
• A two-month rental doesn't make a lot of sense for the Pirates. Stars who'll become free agents after this season aren't likely to sign with the Pirates, due to the team's salary constraints. So pending free agents would be with the club for only August, September and however long October lasts. That eliminates Price, Kazmir, Cueto, Leake, Zobrist, and Cespedes. Also Gomez, who'll be a free agent after next season (not that the Pirates need a new center fielder). 
• A bigger reason rentals don't make sense is the Pirates' place in the standings. They enter play tonight 5.5 games behind the Cardinals, 101 games into the season. Could they overtake the Cardinals and skip the wild card game? Sure, it's possible. Would a Cueto or a Cespedes help? Yes, of course. But realistically, the Pirates have won their league or division 16 times. They have never trailed by 5.5 games or more after 101 games and gone on to win. Giving up prime prospects in pursuit of a divisional title that isn't likely to come? That doesn't make sense. On the other hand, the Pirates are currently three games ahead of the Giants for the first wild card, five ahead of the Cubs, 7.5 ahead of the Mets. Nothing's certain, but they look pretty solid for the wild card, no better or worse. It's hard to justify paying a lot to try to exceed or defend that.

So whom did the Pirates get?

• Aramis Ramirez: Already covered this. He'll fill on at third until Josh Harrison comes back from the disabled list, and will continue to play there when the versatile Harrison plays other positions.
• Joe Blanton: He effectively replaces Vance Worley, who was waived. Most fans have two images of Blanton: The guy who went 2-0 in the 2008 postseason, starting three games that his team, the Phillies, won, en route to the World Series championship; and the arsonist who put up ERAs of 5.33, 5.01, 5.00, 4.99, and a hideous 6.51 from 2010-2013. After taking 2014 off, he signed a one-year contract with the Royals this year, for whom he put up decent numbers: 3.89 ERA, 41.2 innings, 1.20 WHIP, 40 strikeouts and just 6 unintentional walks. He'll fill the role of right-handed long reliever/possible spot starter.
• Joakim Soria: He's probably the best player the Pirates added. He was the Royals' closer from 2008-2011, had Tommy John surgery, and came back as a middle reliever for Texas in 2013. He was the Rangers' closer in 2014 and was traded mid-season to the Tigers, for whom he was the closer this year. He'll take his very good 2.85 ERA and less good 1.8 home runs per nine innings (league average for relievers is 1.0) to the Pirates bullpen, where he'll reduce the workload for his teammates. He'll provide  a right-handed counter to left-handed setup man Tony Watson, who had a 1.69 ERA through June 25 and a 7.56 ERA since. 
• J.A. Happ: In pitching coach Ray Searage we trust. Happ, a left-handed starter, hasn't had an ERA below 4.00 since 2010, including this year, when he racked up a 4.64 ERA playing for Seattle, which plays in pitcher-friendly Safeco Field. Yes, the Pirates need a starter now that they've put A.J. Burnett on the disabled list with a sore elbow, but is Happ the answer? Here's a clue: This year he's thrown his four-seam (straight) fastball 49% of the time and his two-seam (sinking) fastball 15%. The Pirates, as you probably know, emphasize sinking pitches that generate ground balls. Before the 2013 season, the Pirates acquired a left-handed starter (like Happ) who threw both types of fastballs (like Happ). The player they signed has virtually eliminated the four-seamer, become a ground-ball stud (seventh highest ground ball percentage), and posted the 14th-lowest ERA in the National League (among 55 ERA qualifiers) in the three seasons since, 3.12. Am I suggesting that J.A. Happ can be the next Francisco Liriano, who's put up those number since 2013? Probably not, but we're talking about the No. 5 guy in the rotation until Burnett comes back, so there isn't a lot of risk. Happ's a free agent after this season, and his performance to date probably dictates a pay cut from the $6.7 million he's making in 2015.
• Mike Morse: I've talked about the Pirates' need to add a right-handed bat. Morse, a right-handed bat that's due $8.5 million in 2016, probably wasn't anybody's first choice. He batted .294 with a .343 on base percentage and a .514 slugging percentage in four years in Washington from 2009-2012, followed by a terrible .215/.270/.381 in 2013 with Seattle and Baltimore in 2013, a .279/.336/.475 rebound with San Francisco last year, and another bad year to date, .213/.276/.313 with the Marlins. He's been injury prone, but his role in Pittsburgh is likely to be that of pinch hitter and right-handed platoon partner for Pedro Alvarez at first, which should reduce wear and tear. He's a bad fielder at first, which constitutes an improvement over Alvarez. He can also play outfield, in the sense that Kardashians can read poetry: It's possible, but you'd rather not see it. He has been worse than useless against left-handed pitching this season (2-for-22, no extra base hits) but over his career, his .271/.331/.473 slash line against southpaws is a lot better than Alvarez's .198/.267/.322. 

All told, the Pirates improved themselves, in my view. Maybe not dramatically--Morse gives me flashbacks to Justin Morneau, whom the Pirates acquired at the end of August in 2013 and batted .260 with only 3 RBI over 25 games--but Soria eases pressure on the bullpen, Ramirez and Happ address short-term injury-related needs, and Blanton may be an upgrade over Worley. It's nothing flashy, but the Pirates don't appear to be a team that would benefit from flashy nor be hurt by the lack thereof.

Is A.J. Burnett Broken?

In two starts following the All-Star Break, A.J. Burnett has allowed 27 baserunners (16 singles, four doubles, two homers, four hit batters, one walk) in 11.2 innings, giving up 11 runs, all earned, for an 8.49 ERA. Granted, that's only two games, but this appears to be more than disappointment over being named to his first All-Star Game but not appearing; his ERAs have risen every month this season:

Month	ERA	GS	IP	H	R	ER	HR	BB	SO	HBP	BK	WP	BF	WHIP	SO9	SO/W
April	1.80	4	25.0	24	5	5	1	7	20	1	0	0	101	1.240	7.2	2.86
May	1.82	6	39.2	31	10	8	1	13	39	1	0	1	156	1.109	8.8	3.00
June	2.41	5	33.2	40	11	9	1	7	27	0	0	2	143	1.396	7.2	3.86
July	4.68	5	32.2	40	17	17	3	7	24	6	1	2	147	1.439	6.6	3.43

Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Original Table

Generated 7/26/2015.

I think you know most of those column headings. BF is batters faced, WHIP is walks plus hits over innings pitched, SO9 is strikeouts per nine innings, SO/W is strikeout to walk ratio.

Obviously, the ERA's a concern. He's allowed more earned runs so far in July than he did in any two other months combined. His strikeout rate is down, and while he's not walking more hitters, those six hit batters indicate a lack of control. So what's going on?

I'm going to walk through a few steps that I like to check when a pitcher's effectiveness changes.

tl;dr: Burnett's been throwing pretty much the same pitches, at the same velocities, to the same spots of late. However, he's facing tougher opponents than he did earlier in the year, and when batters make contact, they've been hitting the ball harder than in the past. There is also a fair amount of evidence that Burnett's been just unlucky of late, suggesting that he could rebound from his July performance.

Has his repertoire changed? Sometimes a pitcher will change his mix of pitches, changing his overall outcomes. Burnett throws four pitches: A four-seam (straight) fastball, a two-seam (sinking) fastball, a curve, and a changeup. Here are his mix of pitches, by month, from Brooks Baseball:

Month	Fourseam	Sinker	Curve	Change
April	11%	53%	32%	3%
May	11%	57%	29%	3%
June	8%	52%	33%	7%
July	7%	59%	28%	7%

Do you see any big changes there? Me neither. Yes, he's throwing a few more changeups and fewer four-seam fastballs, but we're not talking a big shift.

Has his velocity changed? Burnett is 38 and in (he swears) his last season. There are only three starting pitchers in the majors who are older: San Francisco's Tim Hudson (40), Toronto's R.A. Dickey (40), and the Mets' Bartolo Colon (42). Might he be slowing down? Here are the velocities of his pitches, per month:

Month	Fourseam	Sinker	Curve	Change
April	91.6	91.4	82.4	85.8
May	92.3	92.2	82.7	86.3
June	92.4	91.7	82.7	85.9
July	92.2	91.5	82.4	85.6

There's almost no change there. Decreased velocity is not an issue.

Has his command changed? Velocity's nice, but it's not the whole story. Among National League pitchers, the Pirates' Arquimedes Caminero has the third highest average fastball velocity, 97.9 mph. But among Pirates pitchers with at least 40 innings pitched, he has the highest home rate and second-highest ERA, because major league hitters can hit just amount any pitch if it misses its intended spot. 

Here are his percentage of Burnett's pitches in the strike zone, starting in April: 48.0%, 49.5%, 47.8%, 48.5%. He's been right around the National League average of 47.9% all year. 

Of course, just throwing strikes isn't the story, either. Brooks Baseball tracks what it calls "grooved pitches." Think of the strike zone as a 3x3 grid, with nine identically-sized squares. The one right in the middle of the grid--the "middle middle" pitch, in the middle of the zone horizontally and vertically--routinely gets crushed. Andrew McCutchen is batting .393 with a .699 slugging percentage on middle-middle pitches. Starling Marte is .347/.551. Neil Walker, .313/.567. On the other side of the ball, Burnett has given up a .270 batting average and .358 slugging percentage overall this year, but .347/.569 middle/middle. So has he been grooving his pitches more? Nope. Here are his percentage of grooved pitches against right handed batters: April 6.9%, May 5.8%, June 6.3%, July 5.9%. Against lefties: April 5.0%, May 5.5%, June 4.5%, July 6.1%. It's all pretty consistent.

OK, so he's not missing the strike zone, and when he's in the strike zone, he's not missing his spots. How about when he's outside the strike zone? How is he at getting batters to swing at pitches outside the strike zone, where they're more likely to make weak contact? It turns out he's gotten better as the year's progressed: swings on 28% of pitches outside the strike zone in April, 24% in May, 33% in June, 30% in July. 

Are his pitches getting hit harder? His ground ball rate is down, and Pirates pitchers live on ground balls: 56% in April, 55% in May, 52% in June, 50% in July. Do hitters know what pitch is coming and therefore hit it harder? Well, they're making a little more contact, whiffing on 19% of Burnett's pitches in April, 21% in May, 18% in June, and 17% in July. The National League average is 21%. However, as he's allowed more contact, he's induced more soft contact: 15% of batted balls in April, 16% in May, 17% in June, 21% in July. Yet at the same time, he's allowing more hard contact as well: 27% in April, 33% in May, 27% in June, but (gulp) 43% in July. That's the second highest hard contact rate in the league in July. However, he's middle of the pack in soft contact this month. So batters are making more and harder contact off Burnett, though I'd really like to see another month of data to see whether this is a trend or a blip.

Is he facing tougher opponents? This gets overlooked a lot, but it's important in an era in which starting pitchers get, at most, 35 starts per year. If a starting pitcher goes against the Mets and Phillies (each scoring 3.5 runs per game) a lot more than the Rockies and Diamondbacks (4.4 each), he's likely to have better numbers than a starter who does the opposite. Let's divide each 15-team league into thirds to define good-hitting, average, and weak-hitting teams. During April, Burnett faced two good-hitting teams (Diamondbacks, Tigers), one average (Reds), and one weak (Cubs). In May, he faced three average teams (Cardinals, Reds, Padres) and two weak (Mets, Phillies). In June he faced two good (Giants, Nationals), two average (Brewers, Reds), and one weak (Phillies). In July he faced two good teams (Nationals, Tigers), and two average ones (Cardinals, Royals). He hasn't caught a breather, opponent-wise, since his June 14 start against the Phillies. So some of the deterioration in his performance is probably just a reflection of pitching against better-hitting teams.

Has he been unlucky? This is the trickiest question, because it depends on how one defines luck. Baseball analysts look at three statistics: batting average on balls in play (BABIP), percentage of baserunners left on base (strand rate), and percentage of fly balls going over the fence (HR/FB).

This doesn't mean that these figures are all a product of luck. Let's take two pitchers: Phillies ace/trade bait Cole Hamels, whose career ERA is 3.30, and his teammate Jerome Williams, currently sporting a 6.28 ERA and a career ERA of 4.55. Hamels' career BABIP is .285, Williams' is .290. Hamels' career strand rate is 76.9%, Williams' is 70.5%. Hamels' career HR/FB rate is 11.0%, Williams' is 12.0%. Does that mean Hamels' superior ERA is a product of BABIP, strand rate, and HR/FB luck? Certainly not; he's legitimately a better pitcher, and his numbers reflect it, across the board.

But variations in those figures can reflect luck. BABIP can be helped by scorching line drives hit right at a fielder and hurt by a pop-up that falls just beyond the reach of a retreating infielder. Strand rate is affected by clustering of hits; if a pitcher allows two singles, and no other baserunners, in each of three innings, he'll give up six hits and no runs. If a pitcher gives up no hits in two innings and six singles in his third, he'll also give up six hits, but will probably give up four runs. As for HR/RB, a 400 foot drive to straightaway center is a home run at Angel Stadium of Anaheim (the fence is 396 feet from home) but doesn't even reach the warning track drive at the Marlins Park in Miami (422 feet). So each of those factors can be influenced by circumstances other than the pitcher's skill.

Consider, for example, Hamels' disappointing 2009 season. After going 15-5 with a 3.39 ERA in 2007 and 14-10 with a 3.09 ERA in 2008, he slumped to 10-11, 4.32 in 2009. He was supposed to be the ace of my fantasy team that year, and toward the end of the season, I changed my team's name to Cole Hamels You Suck. But did he really suck? Let's look at those three luck indicators, from 2008 (when he was good), 2009 (the year in question), and 2010 (good again; 12-11, 3.06 ERA):

• BABIP: .259,.317, .289
• Strand rate: 76%, 72%, 83%
• HR/FB: 11%, 11%, 12%

OK, the last one didn't change much. But his 2009 BABIP and strand rate were career worsts for him. More hits dropped in that year (and no, it wasn't because batters were hitting the ball with authority; his hard contact rate of 26% in 2009 was the second best of his career), and they came more often with batters on base. His "peripheral stats"--strikeout, walk, and home run rates--were more suggestive of a pitcher with an ERA in the mid-threes, rather than his career-high 4.32. And, sure enough, he rebounded to a 3.06 ERA the following year.

So let's look at Burnett's BABIP, strand rate, and HR/FB, April-July:

Month	BABIP	Strand	HR/FB
April	.319	88%	5.3%
May	.294	80%	4.3%
June	.361	79%	4.2%
July	.352	74%	10.0%

Every single luck indicator has moved the wrong way over the past couple months, during which his ERA's gone from 1.81 in April-May to 2.41 in June and 4.68 in July. This isn't to say that he's been equally effective; as I've shown, he's allowed more hard contact in July, and he's also facing tougher opponents. (The latter's not going to let up; heading into today's games, the Pirates have the fifth toughest schedule in the league over the rest of the season, with an average opponents' winning percentage of .506.) But there's been enough going against him in those luck indicators to make me think that we haven't seen the last of the good A.J. Burnett.

At The 54% Point

The All-Star break is often called the season's halfway point. Games before the break are in the first half, and games after are in the second half. But that's a misnomer. This year, as in pretty much every year, every team's played over 81 (half of 162) games, ranging from 86 to 91 games. The Pirates have played 88, so they're at the 88/162 = 54% point, not the halfway point.

I'm going to assess them in a manner somewhat similar to my repeating "Next Up" feature, in which I describe the Pirates' upcoming opponent.

How Are They Doing? Following two thrilling, extra-inning, come-from-behind victories over the division-leading St. Louis Cardinals, giving the Pirates three wins in a four-game series, the Pirates are 53-35. They're 2.5 games behind the Cardinals, and they have the second-best record in the entire National League. They're percentage points behind the Kansas City Royals for the second-best record in the majors. Following a 12-10 April, the fifth best record in the league, and a sixth-best 14-14 May, the Pirates have been the hottest team in baseball, going 17-9 in June (a game behind the Cardinals and half a game behind the Blue Jays) and a major league-best 10-2 so far in July. They've scored 4.05 runs per game, the sixth most in the league, and allowed 3.32, the second fewest (trailing only the Cardinals' 2.97). Let's break down their 53-35 record:

• They're below .500, at 17-21, against teams in their own division, but 15-7 against the National League East, 11-2 against the National League West, and 10-5 in interleague play. The latter record represents the most wins and (tied with the Giants) the best record in interleague play in the National League.
• They have the second-best home record, 32-16, and the second-best road record, 21-19. They trail the Cardinals in each.
• Following the heroics of the last two games, they have a 6-7 record in extra innings. Despite what some writers and other pundits may say, there's a big dollop of luck in extra-innings records, so the Pirates' record indicates they've been neither particularly lucky nor unlucky in games that go past nine innings.
• They're 20-13 in one-run games, the best record in the league. A team's record in one-run games is also affected by luck. The most famous recent example is the Baltimore Orioles, whose record in one-run games was a crazy good 29-9 in 2012, easily the best in the majors, but slipped to 20-31 in 2013, rebounding to a league-best 32-23 last season. Sportswriters attributed the team's outstanding record in close games in 2012 and 2014 to the team's spirit and Buck Showalter's managerial acumen but never explained what happened in 2013. (And the Orioles are 12-14 in one-run games this year, the fourth-worst record in the American League.) The point is: The Pirates are unlikely to keep up their torrid pace in close games. I'll get more into this later.
• They have the second-best record in the league, 43-29, against right-handed starting pitchers, and the second-best against lefty starters as well, 10-6.
• The Pirates have beaten up on bad teams, going 34-17 against teams with a record below .500, the third-best record in the league. They've been less effective against teams playing .500 or better, but that's to be expected,. Their 19-18 record against teams at .500 or better is the fifth best in the league after the Cardinals, Nationals, Cubs, and Giants.
• The two largest analytically-oriented baseball websites, Baseball Prospectus and FanGraphs, calculate playoff odds for each team. Baseball Prospectus estimates the Pirates have an 87.6% chance of making the postseason, 53.1% chance of getting to the Divisional Series (i.e., past the wild card game), and 4.7% chance of making the World Series. Each of those figures trail only the division-leading Cardinals, Nationals, and Dodgers in the National League. FanGraphs is a bit more optimistic, pegging the Pirates as 95.4% likely to make the postseason (trailing the Cardinals and Dodgers), 67.6% likely to make the Divisional Series (behind the Cards, Nats, and Dodgers), with an 8.6% chance of winning the World Series (behind the Nationals and Dodgers). So they look like a postseason team, as evidenced by their 5.5 game lead over the Cubs for the first wild card and 6.5 game lead over the Mets for the second.
• This is only the 24th Pirates team to win 53 or more games over its first 88. Of the other 23, there were three World Series champions (1909, 1925, and 1971), four National League champions (1901, 1902, 1903, and 1927), five additional teams that made the postseason (1972, 1975, 1990, 1991, and 2013), and eleven that didn't play in the postseason (1893, 1905, 1906, 1907, 1908, 1921, 1923, 1929, 1938, 1962 and 1966). Excluding 1893, when there wasn't a postseason, 55% of Pirates teams that won at least 53 of their first 88 games have made the postseason, including a perfect six-for-six since divisional play began in 1969. Of course, last year's Brewers were only a game worse than the Pirates at this point, and their participation in the postseason was dependent on whether they watched it on TV.

What's Going Right and Wrong? Let's break this down a little differently. I'm going to look at records both year to date and for the 30 days ending Sunday (the last day before the All-Star Break). I'll list the raw numbers and where the Pirates rank in the National League. The default for rankings is most (e.g., the Pirates have stolen 63 bases, the third most in the league) except where noted otherwise.

Let's start with hitting. Feel free to skip the bullet points, which list a bunch of numbers, and jump to the next paragraph.

• Batting average: .256 year to date (sixth in the league), .261 past 30 days (fifth)
• On base percentage: .317 YTD (eighth), .330 past 30 (second)
• Slugging percentage: .381 YTD (ninth), .377 past 30 (tenth)
• Home runs: 67 YTD (thirteenth), 17 past 30 (fifteenth)
• Stolen bases: 63 YTD (third), 19 past 30 (tied for sixth)
• Strikeout percentage: 20.5% of plate appearances YTD (ninth fewest), 20.3% past 39 (eighth fewest)
• Walk percentage: 6.9% of plate appearances YTD (eleventh), 7.5% past 30 (seventh)
• Batting average on balls in play: .309 YTD (fifth), .321 past 30 (fourth)
• Ground ball percentage: 48.6% YTD (third), 48.5% past 30 (second)
• Soft (weak) contact: 18.4% of batted balls YTD (tenth), 18.5% past 30 (tenth)
• Percentage of pitches in the strike zone: 47.5% YTD (eleventh), 47.5% past 30 (tenth)
• Swings at pitches outside the strike zone: 31.1% YTD (ninth fewest), 30.1% past 30 (sixth fewest)

So the Pirates have been so-so offensively year to date but improved lately, in large part due to increased patience: fewer swings on pitches outside the strike zone, resulting in more bases on balls. The biggest problem's been a propensity to hit balls on the ground, coupled with an inability to hit home runs. They're related, of course, but even looking just at the team's fly balls, only 9.5% have cleared the fence, the sixth fewest in the league. Their batting average on balls in play compares to a league average of .301 and may indicate a little bit of luck in terms of where their batted balls fall in. Overall, the Pirates have been OK with the bat, though with a disappointing lack of power.

Moving on to starting pitching:

• ERA: 3.05 YTD (second lowest), 3.07 past 30 (sixth lowest)
• Strikeout percentage: 21.1% YTD (sixth), 19.2% past 30 (seventh)
• Walk percentage: 7.4% YTD (tenth lowest), 7.0% past 30 (tenth lowest)
• Batting average on balls in play: .300 YTD (ninth lowest), .297 past 30 (ninth lowest)
• Ground ball percentage: 53.4% YTD (second), 53.1% past 30 (second)
• Soft contact: 22.0% of batted balls YTD (first), 25.7% past 30 (first)
• Percentage of pitches in the strike zone: 45.0% YTD (fifteenth), 45.1% past 30 (twelfth)
• Swings at pitches outside the strike zone: 31.1% YTD (sixth), 32.1% past 30 (seventh)

You can't argue with the team's ERA, and the starters have followed the Pirates gameplan of the past few years: Induce a lot of weak contact on the ground. Nearly 30% of the pitches thrown by Pirates starters have been sinking (two-seam) fastballs, the most in the league by far; the Mets are second at 24%. They don't pound the zone (last in the league in pitches in the strike zone), so if batters stop chasing pitches outside the strike zone, the walk rate could climb. So far, though, so good. 

Now, the relievers:

• ERA: 2.48 YTD (second lowest), 2.17 past 30 (lowest)
• Strikeout percentage: 21.5% YTD (tenth), 21.9% past 30 (eighth)
• Walk percentage: 6.6% YTD (lowest), 5.3% past 30 (lowest)
• Batting average on balls in play: .284 YTD (fourth lowest), .258 past 30 (third lowest)
• Ground ball percentage: 49.9% YTD (second), 47.0% past 30 (fifth)
• Soft contact: 23.2% of batted balls YTD (first), 21.9% past 30 (third)
• Percentage of pitches in the strike zone: 46.6% YTD (eleventh), 46.7% past 30 (tenth)
• Swings at pitches outside the strike zone: 34.3% YTD (first), 35.2% past 30 (first)

The relief corps has been successful at just about everything. Like the starters, they induce a lot of weak contact and ground balls. They throw the second-fewest "straight" (four-seam) fastballs and (by a good margin) the most sinking fastballs in order to get these results. They are also the embodiment of the On The Field Of Play mantra, it's good to throw strikes, it's better to get strikes. They are middling at the number of pitches thrown to the strike zone, but no team's relievers are more adept at getting batters to chase pitches outside the strike zone. It's worth noting that Pirates relievers have pitched the seventh most innings in the league, 272.1, but, as I've pointed out, due to their efficiency, they've thrown the fourth fewest pitches, easing concerns about overwork.

So, in summary, the offense has been OK, the starting pitching very good, and the relief pitching great. What's left...oh yeah, fielding. The Pirates have committed 62 errors, the third most overall. They're tied for first with 39 fielding errors and eighth with 23 throwing errors. Because of their grounder-inducing pitching staff and aggressive use of infield shifts, they're second in the league in double plays, with 252, but this is not a good fielding team. By one advanced metric, Defensive Runs Saved, they're ninth in the league; by another, Ultimate Zone Rating, they're thirteenth. They've turned 68.8% of batted balls into outs, exactly the league average. 

Who's Hot and Who's Not? Instead of going through players, I'm going to go position by position. I'm going to rely heavily on OPS+, which is on base percentage plus slugging, adjusted for ballpark effects.

Catcher: Pirates catchers--roughly 70% Francisco Cervelli and 30% Chris Stewart--are third in the league in OPS+. This has been the most significantly positive offensive surprise for the club this year. Cervelli also ranks fifth in the league in pitch framing, the ability of catchers to get strike calls on borderline pitches. Keeping the two catchers healthy (especially Cervelli, who is 52 plate appearance shy of matching his career high) will be a key objective. 

First Base: From positive surprise to negative: the Pirates (75% Pedro Alvarez, 20% Sean Jlast in slugging (.395). On top of that, Alvarez leads the league in errors with 14--no other first baseman has more than five--and he's last in advanced fielding metrics.

Second Base: Neil Walker's played about 85% of the team's innings at second, with Josh Harrison getting almost all of the rest. Walker's been fine. The Pirates are fifth in the league in OPS+ at second base, and Walker's having his basic Neil Walker season. His OPS+ since 2010 (100 is league average): 119, 108, 112, 114, 127, 111. He hasn't matched last year's blip, but he remains one of the top second basemen in the league. He's also turning 30 in September, and he's a free agent after this season, so this could be the last season with the Pirates for the Pittsburgh native.

Shortstop: Another disappointment so far, as Jordy Mercer and Jung Ho Kang have combined (at about an 80/20 split) to deliver the third lowest OPS+ in the league. Mercer, who hit 12 homers last year, has only two so far this season, while Kang has been a considerably worse hitter at shortstop (.250/.290/.344 slash line) than at third (.289/.380/.416), probably more a matter of bad luck than anything.

Third Base: The Pirates have been OK--ninth in the league in OPS+, split between Harrison and Kang about 55/45--but Harrison has declined from last year's breakout. In 2014, he batted .315/.347/.490, with an OPS+ of 134. In 2013, he batted .250/.290/.409 with an OPS+ of 96. When he went on the disabled list earlier this month with a thumb injury, he was hitting .279/.313/.384 with an OPS+ of 94, looking a lot more like the 2013 Harrison than the 2014 version.

Left Field: I was surprised to see that the Pirates rate only ninth in OPS+, considering that Starling Marte is having a good season. He's already tied his career high for home runs (13) and has a 117 OPS+, 17% better than the average player. He's also been the best fielder on the team. But then I realized that he's been the Pirates' left fielder only about 80% of the time, as he's also played some center and missed six games. Here's the problem with the Pirates left fielders:

Player	G	PA	AB	R	H	2B	3B	HR	RBI	SB	CS	BB	SO	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS
Starling Marte	74	313	288	40	77	14	0	13	47	13	5	16	78	.267	.317	.451	.769
Everybody else	14	72	87	4	11	0	0	1	2	1	1	4	10	.164	.222	.209	.431

Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Original Table
Generated 7/16/2015.

Here's how you read that table: The Pirates had better hope Starling Marte stays healthy.

Center Field: OK, I was worried, but come on, on the morning of April 28, Andrew McCutchen was batting .175 with a .299 on base percentage and .302 slugging percentage. His OPS was .600. Since then, he's batted .325/.417/.550, a .967 OPS. Pirates center fielders (it's been McCutchen over 92% of the time) have the highest OPS+ in the league, second in the majors behind the Mike Trout-led Angels.

Right Field: Another problem area, as Gregory Polanco, despite his recent heroics, is primarily responsible (he's been the team's right fielder about three quarters of the time) for the Pirates ranking 13th in the league in OPS+ in right field: tenth in batting, 12th in on base percentage, and 14th in slugging percentage. They've hit only four home runs. Last year, there were concerns that Polanco, who was 22 when he was called up in June, was rushed to the majors. He posted an 84 OPS+, indicating that we was 16% below average as a hitter, in 2014. This year, he's the same guy, with an 83 OPS+.

So on offense, the Pirates have four good positions (catcher, second base, center field, and left field), one okay position (third base) and three problem areas (first base, shortstop, and right field). Jordy Mercer has played better of late (.282/.318/.369 slash line over the last 30 days). Polanco (.216/.333/.307) and Alvarez (.230/.266/.365) have not. Polanco and Alvarez both bat left, and both are overmatched by left-handed pitchers. You think the Pirates might be looking to add a right-handed bat?

Pitching: There's really not a lot to complain about here. Charlie Morton has the highest ERA of the starters, at 4.15, and a worryingly low strikeout rate (13.6% of batters faced; the league average is 19.2%). A.J. Burnett is probably not going to sustain a 2.11 ERA, and I've expressed my concern that the relievers have been ridden hard (though not as hard as the raw numbers indicate, due to their efficiency in keeping pitch counts low). The sparkling team ERA of 2.86 is likely to rise, though I'm basing that more on logic--no team's had an ERA that low over a full season since 1972, when it prompted the American League to adopt the designated hitter--than anything that seems unusually lucky about the performance to date.

What's the Outlook? Matt Trueblood (who's become one of my favorite baseball analysts; his stuff is consistently spot-on) wrote a pretty compelling piece on Baseball Prospectus arguing that the Pirates are due for a second-half decline, largely due to two factors: First, that record in one-run games is pretty unsustainable and more likely due to luck rather than a sustainable skill. Second, while the Pirates have had a fairly soft schedule to date, they'll face almost exclusively teams with a winning record (other than divisional foes Cincinnati and Milwaukee) after the break: Nine against the Cubs and Cardinals, six against the Dodgers, four against the Nationals, and three each against the Mets and Royals.

I have to agree with Matt. But playing worse in the second half doesn't mean finishing out of the money for the playoffs. The Cardinals are a very good team that just got its best hitter back. This could be the third straight wild card year for the Bucs.