What's Bugging the Statheads About This World Series

Every postseason, it seems, engenders a de rigueur response from someone in the media about how one team or the other or the style of play or something infuriates the stats guys, sabermetricians, Moneyball crowd (my favorite term of disrespect, because it misses the point of the book, which is exploiting market inefficiencies, not statistical analysis), whatever. This year's Series brought out a larger-than-usual number of such columns, given that both teams don't hit a lot of home runs, strike out much, or draw a bunch of walks. The Giants were 17th, 17th, and 21st in the majors in home runs, strikeouts, and walks, respectively, while the Royals were famously last in all three categories, the first such team to make it to the Series. Add the Royals' penchant for stolen bases (153, first in the majors, 11% more than the second-ranked team) and sacrifice bunts to extend the narrative.

Not that any of this is really all that true. I mean, yes, the Royals were last in those categories during the regular season, but, as I pointed out after Kansas City won the ALCS, they made it to Series by hitting an above-average number of homers, walking at a much higher-than-average rate, and striking out about as frequently as everyone else. As for the speed, well, the Royals have attempted only five stolen bases in the ALCS and World Series, and were successful only twice, so the stolen base has been more a detriment than a weapon for them.

But there's one thing that both managers have done that's fair game for criticism from he analytic community: Sticking with their starters too long. The times through the order penalty (TTO) refers to what happens to starting pitchers each successive time they face the opposing team's lineup. The longer a pitcher goes, not only does he get tired, but the hitters get used to his delivery and timing, making it easier to make contact.

In 2014, for example, in batters' first plate appearance against a starting pitcher, they batted .246 with a .304 on base percentage and a .377 slugging percentage. They hit home runs in 2.3% of plate appearances, walked in 7.1%, and struck out in 21.1%.

In the second plate appearance, batters' slash line improved to .256/.313/.395. They homered in 2.3% of plate appearances, walked in 7.0%, struck out in 19.1%.

In the third plate appearance, the slash line was .268/.327/.421. Per plate appearance, batters homered 2.7% of the time, walked 7.4%, and struck out 17.7%.

The pattern is pretty clear: The more times a pitcher faces a batter, the more hits, home runs, and walks he gives up, and the fewer strikeouts he gets. 

This has played out in the Series:

• In Game Two, the teams were tied at two runs apiece after five. The managers kept their pitchers in, even though both were facing batters for the third time. In the top of the sixth, Royals starter Yordano Ventura allowed two singles and was lifted. Reliever Kelvin Herrera put out the fire. In the bottom of the sixth, Giants starter Jake Peavy allowed a walk and single, was pulled, but both runners scored, and by the time the inning ended, the Giants were losing 7-2. Both starters ran into problems the third time through the order, though only the Giants were burned.
• In Game Three, the Royals were up 1-0 after five. In the top of the sixth, Royals manager Ned Yost let starting Jeremy Guthrie bat, and he grounded out. Giants starter Tim Hudson then faced Royals shortstop Alcides Escobar for the third time. He singled, left fielder Alex Gordon doubled him home, and a groundout and a pitching change later, first baseman Eric Hosmer drove in Gordon. In the bottom of the inning, Yost's decision to let Guthrie bat came back to bite him, as Guthrie allowed a single and a double and then, facing center fielder Gregor Blanco for the third time, a walk. Again, the Royals bullpen put out the fire, as the Royals won 3-2. Again, both starters ran into problems the third time through the order.
• Game Four was a blowout, with the Giants winning 11-4, but the Royals had a 4-2 lead going into the fifth inning. Starting the bottom of the fifth, facing Giants second baseman Joe Panik for the third time, Royals starter Jason Vargas gave up a double. Yost relieved him, so there wasn't much damage, though Panik came around to score in an inning which the Giants tied the game. Vargas gave up a third-time-through-the-order hit that at the time was costly.

I'm not including Games 1 and 5, because the Giants jumped to a first-inning 3-0 lead in the first game, and besides, Madison Bumgarner, who started both games for the Giants, has been invincible in the postseason (six starts, 1.13 ERA, 0.67 WHIP). He also has had a minimal TTO penalty this year, with batters compiling a .706 OPS against him in their first plate appearance, .603 in the second, .675 in the third. (The league average OPS in 2014 was .694.)

Tonight, the starters are Jake Peavy for the Giants and Yordano Ventura for the Royals. Here's how batters did against them in their starts this year:

Jake Peavy	AB	R	H	2B	3B	HR	BB	SO	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS	HR%	SO%	BB%
First plate appearance	258	20	59	12	2	7	23	63	.229	.290	.372	.662	2.4%	24.4%	8.0%
Second plate appearance	263	28	59	13	1	8	17	54	.224	.276	.373	.648	2.8%	18.9%	5.9%
Third plate appearance	220	34	71	17	4	8	22	40	.323	.387	.545	.933	3.1%	15.7%	8.6%

Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Original Table
Generated 10/28/2014.

Yordano Ventura	AB	R	H	2B	3B	HR	BB	SO	BA	OBP	SLG	OPS	HR%	SO%	BB%
First plate appearance	245	11	52	10	3	1	20	54	.212	.276	.290	.566	0.4%	20.1%	7.4%
Second plate appearance	241	33	60	13	1	8	26	57	.249	.326	.411	.737	3.0%	21.1%	9.6%
Third plate appearance	181	18	48	5	1	4	20	42	.265	.340	.370	.710	2.0%	20.5%	9.8%

Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Original Table

Generated 10/28/2014.

Peavy has been pretty good through the first couple times through the order but he's collapsed the the third time through. That .933 OPS that he's allowed--well, Mike Trout, who will be the AL MVP, had a .939 OPS this year. Giants manager Bruce Bochy really shouldn't let him pitch after he's gone through the Royals lineup twice.

As for Ventura, he's been nails the first time through the order, but below average thereafter: the .725 OPS he's allowed the second and third time through the order compares to an AL average of .706.

Presumably, both pitchers will be on short leashes tonight, with the Giants one win from the championship and the Royals one loss from elimination. But if we see, say, Peavy come out in the sixth to face the Royals lineup a third time, clinging to a one- or two-run lead, we could see more sixth-inning fireworks (12 of the 42 runs scored this Series, nearly 30%, have come in the sixth inning, during which starters are typically facing the opponents' batters a third time), courtesy of a failure to understand the times through the order penalty.

Your On The Field of Play Championship Series Primer

American League: Baltimore vs. Kansas City. Here's one of the more unlikely matchups. Before the season, Baseball Prospectus, FanGraphs, and ESPN all picked the Orioles to finish last in the American League East. (I had them in fourth.) BP and FanGraphs had the Royals in third in the American League Central, below .500, while ESPN had them second with 83 wins. (I had them in second, too, though with 89 wins, a totally lucky guess.)

Let's start with a couple striking similarities. By just about every advanced fielding metric, these two teams play the best defense in the American League. The Orioles have done it despite losing two top fielders to injury, catcher Matt Wieters and third baseman Manny Machado. 

They also have two of the best bullpens in the league. The Orioles' reliever ERA of 3.10 is third in the league, and the Royals' 3.30 is fifth. The Orioles have been helped by an unusually low batted average on balls in play, .274, second lowest in a league where the average is .292, while the Royals relievers have allowed home runs on only 7.5% of fly balls, lowest in the league compared to an average of 9.2%. So they've each been a little lucky. The Royals have blown only 12 saves all year, second lowest in the league, while Orioles led the league in Holds (save-qualifying leads preserved for another reliever) with 97. Their starters had virtually identical ERAs, 3.60 for Kansas City and 3.61 for Baltimore.

After defense and pitching, though, the teams diverge. The Orioles were first in the league in homers with 211, 34 more than the next-highest club. The Royals were last with 95, 16 lower than the next-lowest. The Orioles struck out in 21% of their plate appearances, the fifth highest in the league, but the Royals were the toughest team to fan in the league. The Orioles led the league in isolated slugging (slugging percentage minus batting average, a measure of power) and the Royals were last. The Royals led the league in steals, handily, with 153 (31 more than the next highest). (As Rob Neyer pointed out, though, the Royals' two speedsters, Jarrod Dyson and Terrance Gore, combined for zero runs scored during the Divisional Series. Zilch.) The Orioles were last in steals, handily, with 44 (19 fewer than the next lowest). The Orioles scored 48% of their runs on homers, first in the majors; the Royals got 25% of their runs via the long ball, last in the majors. When they made contact, Royals batters hit 47% ground balls, second most in the league, and 32% fly balls, second fewest. Orioles batters hit 37% fly balls, second most in the league, and 43% ground balls, fourth fewest.

Then there are the managers. The Orioles' Buck Showalter is widely viewed as a brilliant strategist as well as a great motivator. He's a near-certain choice for AL Manager of the Year. The Royals' Ned Yost...well, not so much.*


To me, Showalter vs. Yost favors the Orioles, as does the Orioles offense vs. the Royals offense. The starting staffs, on paper, look pretty even, though, as I mentioned in my Postseason Primer:

Overall, there's part of me that thinks that the Orioles have been doing it with mirrors: Starting rotation led by Chris Tillman, Wei-Yin Chen, Bud Norris, and Miguel Gonzalez, 54-29 with a 3.44 ERA after a combined 109-104, 4.16 ERA in their prior seasons?

With the two bullpens, expect a lot of six-inning games. The average American League team won 87.5% of games it led after six innings this year. The Royals led the league with a 94.2% percentage, and the Orioles were third at 91.1%. (The Twins somehow snuck in ahead of the Orioles at 91.2%, though their pitchers had to protect 21 fewer leads after six than the Orioles.) Some may worry about the Orioles' dependence on the long ball, especially given that the Royals gave up the third fewest homers this year (128) and the second-lowest percentage of home runs on fly balls (8.2%), but I showed that relying on the home run doesn't harm a team in the postseason. So I'll give a nod to the Orioles bats and the guy in their dugout.

National League: St. Louis vs. San Francisco. I don't have as much to say here, for a simple reason: I don't get the San Francisco Giants. They lose to injury their best on base threat (Angel Pagan) and top slugger (Michael Morse) not named Buster Posey, and they win. (Morse has been activated for the Championship Series, though it's not clear whether he'll be limited to pinch hitting.) They pick up Jake Peavy and his 4.72 ERA from Boston at the trade deadline and he responds with a 2.17 ERA over 12 starts. In a four-game Divisional Series win, they hand the ball to Tim Hudson (8.72 ERA in September) for one start and Ryan Vogelsong (5.53 ERA in September) for another and they give up two runs over 13 innings. They have an OK bullpen (3.01 ERA, third in the league, though clearly helped by an unsustainably low .256 batting average on balls in play) and they put up a 2.33 ERA against the Nationals. I thought the Nationals-Giants series was the most one-sided going in. I sure got that wrong.

Then I compare them to a Cardinals team that was only tenth in the league in runs scored (the Giants were fifth), scored only 16 runs more than they allowed (51 for the Giants), and were 32-23 in one-run games during the regular season, an indicator of luck rather than skill (the Giants were 18-22). As in the other series, there's a manager question, with the Giants' Bruce Bochy, described in an article today as one of the best managers of all time, against St. Louis's Mike Matheny, who, among other things, is in only his third year piloting the Redbirds. 

Overall, I see more questions with the Giants than with the Cardinals. I also see a lot of familiarity: The Giants won the World Series in 2010 and 2012, and the Cardinals won in 2011 and lost in 2013. This will be the second straight Giants-Cardinals NLCS and the fifth straight year that one of the two teams will be the National League's representative in the World Series. By contrast, the Orioles haven't been to the ALCS since 1997 and the World Series since winning it in 1983. This'll be the Royals' first ALCS appearance since they won the World Series in 1985. Sentimentality will reside with the American League this year.


* You'll hear Yost is hated by the statsheads. There's some truth to that, as he doesn't really play the percentages, but the media gets the story wrong. They say the stats guys decry stolen bases. That's not right. Stolen bases make sense if the gains from steals outweigh the downside from getting caught. In order for that to be true, you have to be very good at stealing bases, and the Royals are, as their 81.0% success rate was second only the Yankees' 81.2% in the American League. And stolen bases make a lot more sense for a singles-and-doubles team like the Royals than a homer-centric team like the O's. (Side note: The Royals have run wild in the postseason, stealing seven bases in their wild card game and five more in the Divisional Series against the Angels. They got six of those wild card steals against Oakland catcher Derek Norris, who threw out 17% of baserunners attempting to steal this year. The steals against the Angels were with Chris Iannetta behind the plate. He threw out 30%. Orioles catcher Caleb Joseph threw out 40%, tied for the best percentage among catchers in over 50 games, so the Royals will have a harder time stealing on days Joseph's behind the plate.)

The second trait of Yost that gets cited a lot is bunting. Here's the problem with bunting: In 2014, of teams with a runner on first and no outs, they scored, on average, 0.81 runs per inning. Teams with a runner on second and one out--the desired outcome of a sacrifice bunt--scored, on average, 0.62 runs per inning. So a sacrifice with a runner on first and no outs reduces scoring by 0.19 runs per inning. Runner on second with no outs? A sacrifice reduces scoring by 0.15 runs. Runner on first with one out? Reduces scoring by 0.19 runs. First and second with no outs? Reduces scoring by 0.13 runs. Sacrifice bunts reduce runs scored. This isn't a theoretical construct. This is actual data from actual games.

Now, that's not to say that they're always bad. When there's a bad-hitting pitcher at the plate, sacrifice away. I was emailing last week with a friend who's an Angels fan. We were talking about the eighth inning of last Friday night's game, Royals and Angels tied 1-1. Angels outfielder C.J. Cron led off with a double, bringing up catcher Chris Iannetta. Iannetta didn't bunt, and instead flew out to center fielder Jarrod Dyson, who nailed pinch runner Collin Cowgill trying to advance to third for a double play. In that situation, a sacrifice to move Cowgill to third with one out would've decreased the expected runs scored in the inning for the Angels. But it would have slightly increased their chance of scoring scoring one run (probably all they'd need), and would have slightly increased their chance of winning as well. Basically, a sacrifice would have increased the chance of scoring one run but decreased the chance of scoring more than one. So a bunt in that situation, where just one run would've made a big difference, would've made sense (except that Ianetta apparently can't bunt).

The more controversial bunts are when position players bunt, particularly in early innings, when the goal is to score runs, plural, not just one run. And guess what? In 2014, Yost had the Royals position players lay down 30 bunts--tied for sixth in the league. You know who was fifth, with 32 position player bunts? Buck Showalter's Baltimore Orioles. The image of Ned Yost as a mad bunter, whether portrayed by the media or by statheads, really isn't true. (He went crazy in the wild card game, with four bunts, but had only one sacrifice in the three games against the Angels.)